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Abstract: 
The main objectives of TRACE WP5 'Human factors' deliverables are:  
. To support a better standardization of accident analysis in Europe on a scientific background, 
. To provide operational models and methodological classification grids dealing with 'human factors' 
aspects involved in road accidents, 
. To promote a comprehensive analysis of the involvement of human beings, going further than the 
usual 'user-orientated causal analysis' often limited at establishing the driver 'at fault' and without 
searching for the background reasons of the problems met par road users. 
Such objectives involve analyzing accidents as the symptom of the difficulties met by drivers in 
certain driving situations, and as a revelatory of their needs in help. Two questions have to be asked in 
order to progress in the understanding of accident causation: 1) What are precisely and operationally 
the human failures in accidents? But also: 2) What are the reasons for these human failures? Keeping 
in mind that these reasons are of multiple natures and combine most of the time to produce the final 
event. By so doing, the definition of typical scenarios of 'human error' production can open to the 
definition of more appropriate countermeasures, well fitted to human needs.  
 
Keyword list: Human error – Human Factors - Functional failure - Accident situations - Accident 
factors - Accident aggregation – Social factors  
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1 Executive Summary 
1.1 TRACE project: TRaffic Accident Causation in Europe 
The European TRACE project (2006-2008) has been defined to go further in the understanding of the 
overall driving system unsafety by the use of different methodologies: statistical studies, in-depth 
accident investigations and risk analysis. As a matter of fact, road safety is still one of the main societal 
concerns today, in spite of countless amounts of research and development. This shows the necessity 
to go on progressing on the way, and maybe the need to promote new views about accident 
production and the means to fight against it. It is a concern for the European Commission, for 
National Governments, and also for the vehicle industry, insurance companies, driving schools, non-
governmental organisations and more generally for every single road user.  
It is essential nevertheless to acknowledge and keep in mind the massive and efficient work done 
those last decades toward safety by all participants of the driving system. But the more we gain, the 
more efforts we need to progress. For example, car manufacturers have made strong labours which 
have dramatically improved passive safety of their vehicle for the past 15 years; however, current road 
safety research has shown that an asymptote is about to be reached on this aspect in most countries 
and many experts agree that preventive (prevention of accidents) and active safety (recovery of an 
emergency situation) should now, particularly, be brought forward. Such a trend might only be a 
success if road users' characteristics are permanently kept into the loop of safety research and 
development. It is, at least, the claim of the deliverables put forward in the frame of WP5 of TRACE. 
TRACE project has 2 major objectives. The first one addresses the determination and the continuous 
up-dating of the aetiology (i.e. analysis of the causes) of road accidents and injuries, and the definition 
of the real needs of the road users as they are deduced from accident and driver behaviour analyses. 
The second one aims at identifying and assessing, among possible technology-based safety functions, 
the most promising solutions that can assist the driver or any other road users in a normal road 
situation or in an emergency situation. 
So the purpose is first to bring a comprehensive and understandable definition of accident causation 
which goes further and deeper than the usual statements. It is also to provide the scientific 
community, the stakeholders, the suppliers, the vehicle industry and the other Integrated Safety 
program participants with a global overview of the road accident causation issues in Europe and 
promising solutions based on technology. 
1.2 The WP5 'Human Factors' and its deliverables 
In order to gain new knowledge on accident causation, several Methodological Work Packages have 
been defined in the structure of TRACE with the purpose to give a support to the analyses conducted 
into the Operational Work Packages of the project.  
As part of these methodological frames, WP5 has been developed to improve the multidisciplinary 
methodologies which allow the analysis of the role of 'human factors' (in the widest meaning) in road 
accident production. 
Many accident causation systems currently focus much of their attention on the road user and their 
'human errors' which resulted in the accident occurring. By so doing, these 'errors' or failures are 
treated as the main cause of accidents, while the reasons behind them (i.e. the 'factors' of human 
failures) are often given little consideration. Also, 'factors' are often confused with their resultant 
'failures' in the analysis of accidents. 
 In brief, WP5 is oriented toward: 1) the diagnosis of the difficulties met by road users which lead 
them to an accident, 2) the identification of the contexts in which they take place, and 3) the definition 
of the origins of these difficulties whether they are relating to the layout to the vehicles, or to human 
characteristics (physical, cognitive, motivational, but also sociological and cultural). The methods 
developed aim to standardise accident analysis in order to bring validated and comparable results 
from one study to the other, while keeping the scientific and academic background required for a 
comprehensive and efficient research work. 
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Four tasks compose this Work Package. The first three ones are oriented toward the elaboration of an 
operational model permitting a comprehensive analysis and classification of 'human error' generating 
processes. The fourth one is devoted to a further and wider view on the influence of the social and 
societal context on accident occurrence. 
- Task 5.1 A model for human functional failure analysis  
The objective of this first task is to define and characterize the different types of human errors, 
violations and difficulties which are involved in the accident generating process. Such modelling work 
is based both on scientific literature dealing with human error analysis, and on truly in-depth accident 
data. The purpose is to build an operational grid for human functional failures, consistent with 
cognitive ergonomics concepts and specifically adapted to the driving task difficulties. These 
conceptions are developed in TRACE deliverable D5.1: 'Analysing human functional failures in road 
accidents' (Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007a). 
- Task 5.2 A comprehensive grid of factors and situations for human functional failure 
Human failures are explained by factors characterizing the state of system, i.e. the defects of its 
components and of their interactions. These factors are then considered as the explanatory elements of 
the road users' lack of capacity to adapt to the situation in hand. A grid of all the relevant elements 
contributing to human failures has been compiled, and differentiates those factors coming from the 
'human' part of the system, from those coming from the layout, the traffic interaction and the vehicle.  
To put further forward the context in which accident occur, a second grid proposes an operational 
typology of the driving situations (or 'pre-accident situations) in which the drivers were engaged 
when they found a difficulty. These grids are presented in TRACE deliverable D5.2: 'Which factors and 
situations for human functional failures? Developing grids for accident causation analysis' (Naing, Bayer, Van 
Elslande & Fouquet, 2007). 
- Task 5.3 Typical failure-generating scenarios  
The purpose of this third task is to combine the results from T5.1 and T5.2 in order to build a 
methodological frame allowing the aggregation of accident data under the form of generic accidental 
processes, viewed as an integration of the parameters characterizing the accident generation: which 
situation and context, which human failure, which explicative elements, which consequence, etc. They 
will allow putting forward the typical specificities of the difficulties encounters by different types of 
road users, in different types of situations. The method for building such scenarios is defined in 
TRACE deliverable D5.3: 'Typical human functional failure-generating scenarios: a way of aggregation'.  
(Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007b). 
- Task 5.4 Social and cultural aspects of human factors  
This last task is more prospective. Its purpose is to enlarge the scope of Human Factors by analyzing 
the socio-economic/socio-cultural dimension of human activity, and its interaction with the driving 
system. Practically speaking it is turned toward the building of a framework of analysis aimed at 
completing the accident analysis framework proposed in the other Tasks of the WP by putting 
forward broader 'upstream' factors of their role in the production of accident process.  The sociological 
dimensions potentially acting on individual behaviour are presented, in TRACE deliverable D5.4 
'Social and cultural factors' (Engel, 2007) with an opening toward an operational grid of analysis of these 
variables under the form of 'social spheres'. 
1.3 Conclusion 
The present deliverable D5.5 'Analyzing Human factors in road accidents' gives a synthetic view of 
the methodological results put forward in the framework of TRACE WP5. It can be seen as an overall 
introduction regarding the necessity to put forward new advances in the framework of human factors 
involved in road accidents, the more operational aspects of which being found in each WP5 
deliverable mentioned above. The conceptions developed will hopefully be useful to push forward 
scientific research and development efficiently towards human difficulties encountered while driving, 
notably in Europe. 
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2 Introduction 
TRACE Work Package 5 has been dedicated to the analysis of 'Human Factors' in the field of accident 
causation analysis. It is aimed at contributing to a deeper comprehension of the complexity of the 
human aspects involved in driving activity by promoting human centred methodological tools. The 
analytical models and classification grids proposed in TRACE WP5 deliverables try to go further than 
the usual 'user-orientated causal analysis' by enlarging the investigation toward searching for the 
causes upstream human failures. Such a procedure is claimed to be essential if efficient solutions –i.e. 
adapted to human functioning- are to be expected for a safety improvement of the driving system as a 
whole.  
The role played by the human component in the traffic system can be regarded as a hardcore among 
road safety problems to investigate. So it is the case in the frame of an European project such as 
TRACE. In line with this view, this WP5 is devoted to a transversal work aimed at providing 
operational models and methodological support to the other Work Packages of TRACE project, 
concerning the 'human factors' aspects involved in driving and in road accidents resulting from this 
activity. This question is to be studied in detail in order to provide comprehensive results and not only 
general ones as it is commonly the case when dealing with human aspects involved in accidents.  In 
this purpose, all the disciplines of psychology that are relevant for driving behaviour are screened: 
research in human perception, attention, cognition, personality, social, etc. 
In the frame of this Summary Report, the term 'human factors' will be understood under the general 
meaning of 'human aspects involved in driving activity', both in their positive and negative facets. 
This definition is aimed at discarding from any tautological view of the human being considered as 
the main cause of accidents, leading to a pessimistic view as regard as the capacity to improve road 
safety (as far as human is difficult to change and to put apart of the driving system). Its purpose is to 
allow putting forward the very different forms that take these human aspects in the accident 
processing; not forgetting that most of the time the human is the principal factor of the driving system 
efficiency – by compensating for most of the system drawbacks , even if can be subject to failures. 
These failures are then to be taken as object of study, searching for theirs causes and reasons, as many 
variables on which appropriate measures can be undertaken. 
 
The main objectives of the WP5 deliverables which are synthesized in the present report are: 
1. To promote a new view on the involvement of road users in the systemic accident production 
process, going further than the usual 'causal analysis'. This view regards road accidents as the 
symptom of the difficulties met by drivers in certain driving situations, and as a revelator of 
their needs in help.  
2. To help clarifying the distinction to put forward between 'errors' and 'factors' (whereas 
human or not) in accidents, the latter producing the former. 
3. To provide the other TRACE Work Packages with operational models and methodological 
support dealing with 'human factors' aspects involved in road accidents. 
4. To give some cues about factors acting further upstream in the causal process that end up 
with an accident. 
 
The following sessions first situate the human factors work package inside the TRACE system 
functioning, and then explain the necessity felt to go further than the usual -more or less implicit- 
views on 'human factor' or 'human behavior' in accident studies, focusing the analysis only at the 
sharp end of the accident process. 
Subsequently, will be presented the main results of each of the tasks constituting TRACE WP5: 
- Task 5.1 - A model for human functional failure analysis  
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- Task 5.2 - Comprehensive grids of factors and situations explaining human functional failure 
- Task 5.3 - Typical human functional failure-generating scenarios  
- Task 5.4 - Social and cultural aspects of human factors  
 
2.1 WP5 inside TRACE project 
WP5 is part of the methodological Work Packages which have been defined to both feed the 
operational work packages (WP1, WP2 and WP3) and the evaluation Work Package (WP4) with 
adapted methodologies (see Figure 1).   
The WP5 methodological results are thus devoted to better understanding the influence of human 
aspects under play regarding: 1- characteristics of the road users involved (type of vehicle used, age, 
gender), 2- types of situation which provoke specific road users' difficulties (intersection, bend, 
overtaking, etc.) and 3- types of risk factors which affect specifically such or such human failure 
(alcohol, vigilance, layout defects, etc). And the human aspects will be of course at the core of the 
assessment of the capacity of technological safety functions to compensate for drivers needs in help 
(for example, cf. TRACE deliverable D4.1.5).  
 
 
WP1 Road Users WP2 Type of Situations WP3 Type of Risk Factors
WPs operational
WP8 Data supply
Help
WPs methodology
WP5 Human factors
WP7 Statistical methods
WP4 Evaluation
WP6 Safety functions
 
 
Figure 1- WP5 inside TRACE project 
 
The models and grids provided in WP5 aim at supporting improvement and standardization in the 
overall analysis of accident production, and specifically regarding the role of human factors in the 
driving system malfunction processes.  A block diagram illustrating the links between the deliverables 
put forward is presented on Figure 2. 
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Figure 2- Links between TRACE WP5 Deliverables  
 
2.2 Reasons for methodological improvements regarding human factors 
In the field of road safety, it is most often taken for granted that 'human factors', 'human errors' 
and/or 'human behaviour' –these terms being nearly considered as one and the same- are the main 
cause of accidents. The problem behind such a statement is that it is not only subject to question but 
also leads to very few chances of positive amelioration. Apart from changing the human part or 
discarding it from the driving system, both of these solutions not being so easy, otherwise they would 
have been applied a long time ago. This overall statement against human nature is thus poorly 
productive in view of finding solutions to enhance road safety and a wider analysis is thought to be 
useful in line with this objective. Rather than putting the blame on the driver, this wider analysis 
would consider far more useful to search for the needs to fulfil in a way that these drivers are 
performing more efficiently in a more adapted environment with a more adapted vehicle. Such a 
wider view must at least clearly clarify what is understood behind the concepts used so as to avoid 
mixing things. It is the specifically the case for the so-called 'human factors' and 'human errors'. 
- Human factors of driving 
The term 'human factors' in the ergonomic literature generally stands for all the human aspects 
involved in any activity, would they be positive or negative. This is a catch-all term that covers 
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notably the science of understanding the properties of human capability1. This conception is well 
represented by the international 'Human Factors' Journal. And when analyzing road accidents, it is 
worth remembering that the driving system is relying a lot on the capacity of human beings to adapt 
to situations which are often complex, variable and insufficiently defined where no other devices than 
human factors are able to operate and to adapt efficiently, even if this adaptation capacity is subject to 
limits. The problem behind such a label is that it is too often confused with its homonymous 
qualifying the human contributing causes of accidents, figuring only the negative aspects of human 
factors. 
- Human factors of accidents 
Accidents are explained by multi causal factors characterizing the wrong state of a system, i.e. the 
defects of its components (would they be human or other such as technical defects) and the defects in 
the interactions between these components. Accident factors correspond to the main parameters of the 
driving context (relating to the road, the driver, other users, the conditions in which the task is 
performed) that contributed to the user's inability to adapt to a road situation he had to negotiate and 
of its particular demands. And it has to be borne in mind that in the majority of cases it is at the 
interface between the human component and the other components of the system that the problem is 
found to originate. Thus, human factors of accidents refers to the inadequacy of the variables 
characterizing the human component (such as level of experience, of fatigue, of attention, etc.), and 
which combine with the inadequacy of the variables characterizing the other components (road 
layout, vehicle, environment, traffic) to produce 'human errors'. 
- Human errors 
In its common sense definition, human error is most often considered as the main -and more or less 
fatalistic- cause of the problem considered: Human is by nature subject to errors, and it is the reason 
why problems occur. Another implicit aspect of this common sense is that 'error' is confused with and 
taken as synonymous of 'fault'. In such a way that each time a human error is noticeable in a process, 
it becomes the fault of the human being involved in this process. And as being a fault, the only way to 
fight against it is the punishment of its author. This implicit common sense becomes misleading when 
applied to the scientific analysis of a phenomenon such as road accidents, leading analysts to confuse 
human errors and human factors of accident. The problem with such confusion is that it looses any 
potentiality of solution, apart from fatalism and punishing. A scientific analysis of accidents needs a 
precise characterization of these 'human errors', clearly differentiated from the factors that produce 
them, would they be human, environmental, vehicular, etc. Such a differentiation can open to more 
efficient solutions directed toward preventing efficiently well understood human errors by acting on 
their well identified causes, and by promoting a better ergonomics of the driving system in accordance 
with human capacities and weaknesses. 
2.3 WP5 deliverables overview 
Four deliverables have been resulting from the work done, each corresponding to one of the 4 tasks 
forming the TRACE WP5. 
The first one -D5.1: 'Analysing human functional failures in road accidents' (Van Elslande & Fouquet, 
2007a)- defines model and classification grid for analysis of 'human functional failure' (HFF). These 
model and grid have been built on the background of literature dealing with human error analysis, in 
combination with the detailed analysis of human difficulties found in in-depth accident data. The 
purpose was to build an operational method both consistent with cognitive ergonomics concepts and 
specifically adapted to the driving task and its particular malfunctions. The report D5.1 begins with 
setting the way how to consider HFF in such a way as to promote operational measures being able at 
compensating for these driving malfunctions. It then defines and characterizes the different types of 
human failures: errors, violations and capacity exceeding which are involved in the accident 
                                                           
1 Human Factors (also called Ergonomics) is the 'scientific discipline concerned with designing according to the human 
needs, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being 
and overall system performance' (definition adopted by the International Ergonomics Association in 2000)  
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generating process and which need to be clearly identified if efficient solutions are thought to be put 
forward (Figure 6). 
The second deliverable -D5.2: 'Which factors and situations for human functional failures? Developing grids 
for accident causation analysis' (Naing, Bayer, Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007)- has been shaped so as to 
be complementary to D5.1. It presents methodological grids helping to define the causes of HFF and 
the situations which produce them. The factors of human errors correspond to the defective states of 
the driving system, i.e. the deficiency of its components and of their interactions. These factors consist 
in the explanatory elements of the road users' incapacity to adapt to the situation in hand. A grid of all 
the relevant elements contributing to human failures has been compiled, and differentiates those 
factors coming from the 'human' part of the system, from those coming from the layout, the traffic 
interaction and the vehicle.  A second methodological grid put further forward the context in which 
these HFF occur via an operational typology of the driving situations (or so-called 'pre-accident 
situations') in which the drivers were engaged when they found a difficulty (Figure 8).  
The third deliverable -D5.3: 'Typical human functional failure-generating scenarios: a way of aggregation'.  
(Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007b)- proposes a step further toward the integrative analysis of accident 
production regarding human factors. It combines the input from D5.1 and D5.2 in order to build a 
methodological frame allowing bringing together similar accident processes under the form of generic 
accidental patterns. These patterns are viewed as an integration of the parameters characterizing the 
accident generation: which situation and context, which human failure, which explicative elements, 
which consequence, etc. They will allow putting forward the most typical processes of production of 
human failures, i.e. the recurring difficulties encounters by different types of road users, in different 
types of situations, due to such or such combination of factors (Figure 10). 
The fourth and last WP5 deliverable -D5.4 'Social and cultural factors' (Engel, 2007)- is enlarging the 
scope of human factors by taking into account variables which are acting further upstream the 
accident scene. The prospective analysis proposed expands the accident causation view by 
considering the socio-economic/socio-cultural dimension of human activity. Practically speaking D5.4 
is turned toward the building of a framework of analysis aimed at completing the accident analysis 
framework proposed in the other deliverables of the WP by putting forward broader 'upstream' 
factors of their role in the production of accident process. The most important sociological dimensions 
potentially acting on individual behaviour are presented in view of an operational grid of analysis of 
these variables under the form of 'social spheres' (Figure 15). 
The problematic and methodological results described in these 4 deliverables are synthesized in the 
following chapters, giving an overall view on the way to improve accident analysis by developing a 
more scientific regard on 'human factors' than it is usually the case in the frame of road safety. 
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3 A model for Human Function Failure analysis in road 
accident studies (TRACE report D5.1) 
A large majority of safety studies conducted in the frame of road safety tends to come to the 
conclusion that human error is the main cause of accidents. Nevertheless, such a conclusion has not 
proved to be efficient in its capacity to offer adequate means to fight again these so-called 'errors'. For 
the  purpose of better qualifying accident causation in the frame of TRACE, the role of 'human factors' 
in driving task performance and failures has been analyzed from literature review and in-depth 
accident data with the aim of going further than such a simple and reductive statement.  
The TRACE deliverable D5.1 is investigating the different types of 'errors' with the help of a 
classification model formalizing typical 'Human Functional Failures' (HFF) involved in road accidents. 
These functional failures are not seen as the primary causes of road accidents, but as the result of 
further upstream malfunctions characterizing the different components in interaction. So HFF are the 
result of users/road/vehicle bad states and of their defective interactions (unfitness of an element 
with another). Such a view tries to extend 'accident causation' analysis toward understanding, not 
only the resulting 'causes', but also the background processes involved in the accident production. The 
purpose is to go further than establishing the facts, toward making a diagnosis on their production 
process. The usefulness of this diagnosis is to help at defining countermeasures suited to the 
malfunction processes in question, not focalizing only on the last link of this process: the human 
failure to compensate for the difficulty encountered.  
3.1 Driving and accidents as interaction processes 
As stated by numerous authors, the term 'human error' can be misleading, giving the impression that 
an accident is only the result of the last action performed in its sequential course, which is an 
oversimplified conception of how events occur. From the perspective of TRACE WP5, this term have 
been enlarged and conceptually systematized under the notion of Human Functional Failure, insisting 
on the fact that such failures represent the limits in the human functions which otherwise (and most of 
the time) allow the road user to adapt to the difficulties of the driving task. Differentiating from the 
common sense acceptation of 'human error', HFF viewed from an ergonomic meaning will not be 
considered as the origin of the accident, but as the result of factors which involve the different 
components of the system: drivers, vehicles, layout, etc. (cf. § 4). 
Every study needs a theory as a frame to interpret data and lead them to 'results'. Without a clearly 
defined theory every analysis is subject to biases by implicitly referring to naïve theories. In the 
absence of well defined model of reference, analyses of accidents indeed tend to produce typologies 
which mix up very disjoined phenomena, putting for example on the same level: maneuvers, 
processes, factors, consequences, types of collision, etc. Thus, to understand accident data we need to 
rely on an accident production theory, even more when thinking to integrate the complex human 
component in this analysis. The most fruitful -and shared among the community of safety researchers- 
approach appears to be the so-called 'systemic approach'. This approach assumes that the components 
that comprise the transport system include: the users, the transport tools and the infrastructures used. 
These components operate by interacting with one another and the smooth running of the system 
implies that all three components have been adjusted correctly. Seen from this point of view, an 
accident is the result of an incorrectly adjusted interaction between the system components. So the 
cause of accident should not be searched into one or another of these components taken separately, 
but in the defective inter-component interactions (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Interactions within the elementary Human-Vehicle-Environment system 
 
It is important to recognize the specific role of the human element in the traffic system: it is both a 
component and the principal actor of its functioning.  
As a component, the driver is characterized by a certain number of internal variables (e.g. Experience, 
Motivation, Vigilance, Attention, etc.) which are in a certain state, more or less favourable to driving 
task performance. In the same way, the other components of the system are also described by 
variables in a more or less degraded state. The interaction between these components forms the 
driving system and the factors of accidents are to be found inside these human, vehicular and 
environmental states of this system. 
But the driver is also the element that drives the system. It is his or her task to regulate his activity and 
adjust it to the problems arising from the interactions between the different components, including 
him. To negotiate those difficulties, he performs a number of functions, especially cognitive ones. And 
we shouldn't forget that most of the time the use of these functions allows road users to succeed in 
compensating from driving system drawbacks. These human functions are at the basis of the 
(efficient) driving system functioning. But the same functions that usually enable the driver to regulate 
his activity may fail if he encounters major malfunctions within the system that prevent those 
functions from attaining their regulating objective. It results as an output in a functional failure 
(related to detection, cognition and action), which is commonly called 'human error'. 
While it may appear artificial, this distinction between human as component of the system and human 
as actor is nevertheless important insofar as it enables us to differentiate between what are factors -
attributable to the three components of the system - and what corresponds to the resulting difficulties 
in the operator's activity. However much one tries to highlight factors of errors, one thus has to focus 
on man as a component of the system like any other, rather than on his role as an actor who attempts 
to adapt to the difficulties arising from those components.  
To conclude, it is essential not to make the recurring common sense amalgam between 'human error' 
and 'human factor'. For example we shouldn't confuse a detection failure and the different types of 
factors of detection failure (e.g. inattention, visibility obstacle, atypical acceleration from another 
driver, visual acuity, etc.). The detection failure is not the cause of the accident. It is just a link flowing 
from the upstream factors, some being human and other being external. And if concluding that the 
detection failure is the cause of the accident we lose the possibility to find an appropriate solution 
against it, a solution which will differ according to the different causes. The 'error', or in other words, 
the non recovered error2, corresponds to a momentary failure of the one or other of these sensory, 
                                                           
2 The negative consequences of the non recovered errors are far from being turned out (Amalberti, 2001). 
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cognitive and driving functions that the man usually operates to fit his activity to the difficulties of his 
task, where he mostly has success. Such a functional failure figures a limit in the functions capacity as 
a consequence of an integrated set of causal elements. It is therefore necessary to identify the failures 
to understand the specificity of the difficulties met by the users in their regulation attempts. But it is 
also indispensable to analyze correctly the combinations of elements involved in the genesis of these 
failures to be able to define appropriate solutions to well identified problems. 
3.2 Driving and accident as sequential processes 
Driving activity has often been defined as a complex and sequential task. As part of its malfunction 
output, every crash is also the result of a complex and temporal process. Its complexity and 
sequentiality are necessary to consider so as to be able to replace each single intervening element in 
the overall process and, by such, to clarify the role it plays in this process.  If considering only the last 
step of the process, i.e. the crash situation, to understand the accident production, the risk is important 
to mix causes and consequences and to provide useless analysis both on a scientific and operational 
angle. Of course the resulting crash situation is essential to analyse in a secondary safety purpose, but 
the earlier steps of the accident generation must also be taken in a primary safety perspective. This 
basic consideration is nevertheless surprisingly not systematically taken into account in accident 
studies, in spite of the clear methodological work completed in the frame of OECD (1988). 
The first stage of analysis consists of drawing up the accident scenario in terms of the sequence of 
events and, in particular, describing the initial system status, identifying the triggering event and 
reconstructing the emergency manoeuvre. The second stage is to identify the mechanisms that 
contribute to the production of this sequence of events: these mechanisms are found in the system 
component interaction. To achieve this, the scenario is divided into four phases, connected one to the 
others (Figure 4). 
 
Driving    phase Rupture phase
Emergency 
phase Impact  phase
Behaviour on 
approaching 
the place
Meeting an 
unexpected 
event
Avoidance 
manoeuvres 
and dynamic 
demands 
Nature of 
impact
 
Figure 4: Major steps to consider in a sequential analysis of accidents 
 
- The driving phase 
The driving situation can be described as the one in which the user is before a problem arises. It is the 
'normal' situation, which is characterised for the driver by the performance of a specific task in a given 
context, with certain objectives, certain expectations, and so on. It is 'normal' because no unexpected 
demands are made upon him. The driver can adapt effectively, the events unfold in line with his 
predictions, expectations and anticipations. He is not overloaded with information. He controls his 
speed and course; he is 'master of his vehicle'. In more general terms, this means that there is a balance 
between the demands and ability of the system components to respond one to another: alignment, 
skid-resistance, sight distance, tyre wear and pressure, condition of shock absorbers, speed, degree of 
driver awareness, etc.  
It should be noted that 'normality' in this case refers to effectiveness, but not necessarily to compliance 
with traffic regulations.  
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The advantage of the study of this situation is to reveal what the driver considers to be both desirable 
and feasible in a particular place, and in a particular context. 
- The rupture phase 
The 'rupture' is an unexpected event that interrupts the driving situation by upsetting its balance and 
thus endangering the system. That event could be an unforeseen presence or manoeuvre by another 
user, the advent of an infrastructure configuration which takes the driver by surprise, or provokes a 
sudden high workload, and so on. The effect of the rupture situation is to switch the system 
components from a bearable level of demand to a suddenly excessive demand in terms of ability to 
respond. 
It should be noted that an 'unexpected event' does not necessarily mean 'unpredictable'. Which raises 
the question of to what extent it really was unpredictable, and if not, why it was unexpected. 
Information gained on the driving situation is of considerable use when seeking this explanation. 
- The emergency phase 
It is the period during which the driver tries to return to the normal situation by carrying out an 
emergency manoeuvre. A particular feature of this stage is that the driver faces very severe constraints 
(both temporal and dynamic) as regards the options open to him. 
The emergency phase covers the space and time between rupture and impact. If the rupture situation 
gives a statement of the problem in hand, the emergency situation defines the space-time 'credit' 
available in which to solve it. This 'credit' is, by definition, extremely limited. 
The emergency situation can be determined in relation to the driving situation by the sudden 
excessive demand level imposed on the system components. The driver must solve, within a given 
time, a problem that is, in principle, entirely new to him. The range of solutions depends on the 
environment in terms of hostile obstacles or the space available for evasive action. The capacity of the 
vehicle to perform the required manoeuvre depends not only on its design and state of repair but also, 
when referring to vehicle-ground liaison, on the state of the infrastructure. The emergency situation 
reveals the insufficiencies or defects in one or another of the system components, weaknesses that 
remain tolerable when faced with normally moderate driving situation demands. Of course, this 
phase may not be manifested when the driver keeps unaware of the danger until the impact. 
The emergency manoeuvre is an attempt to find a solution to a problem. It sometimes succeeds, but in 
accident databases this manoeuvre has failed. So the emergency situation is followed by the crash 
phase.  
- The crash or impact phase 
The crash phase comprises the crash and its consequences. It determines the severity of the accident in 
terms of material damage and bodily injury. Once again, the situational circumstances depend on 
what has occurred previously and the interaction between the three components: thus an elderly 
person is more vulnerable to injury, modern vehicles are better designed to crashworthiness, a 
protection rail prevents impact with a hostile obstacle, etc. 
From a safe-system model point of view, each of these phases should be considered specifically with 
the purpose of not generating hazards for the driver. So the driving system shouldn't generate 
ruptures, should be forgiving (i.e. giving the possibility to recuperate) in emergency phase, and 
protecting in impact phase. 
 
The identification of these phases (or 'situations') enables the different sequential stages of the accident 
to be reconstituted in a homogeneous manner, which makes it possible not only to analyse each case 
from the viewpoint of the process that engenders it, but also to set up horizontal studies of several 
accidents by comparing the successive stages in their development.  
We are particularly interested in the analysis that follows in the so-called 'accident' or 'rupture' 
situation, which is a key stage that pitches the driver from a normal driving situation into an impaired 
one. That transitional phase is a good place for comparing accidents, to the extent that it marks the 
start of a malfunction process. In the sequence of failures that follows the accidental impact, we thus 
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identify those which characterize this moment of rupture and explain the fact that the driver suddenly 
finds himself in a critical situation. This rupture phase is the transitional step between a controlled and 
an impaired situation. It forms the pivotal moment of the accident generation and the human 
functional failure at this moment will be essential to consider in a purpose of primary safety 
development. 
3.3 Classification Model for Human Functional Failures in accidents 
The objective of the classification model is to help defining in what consist the different types of 
Human Functional Failures and how they can be characterized in an operational way. Such a 
modeling work had to be based both on scientific literature dealing with human error analysis, and on 
truly in-depth accident data.  
3.3.1 Definition of human functional failure 
As stated above, and in the lineage of recent literature works (e.g. Reason, 1995, 2000; Leplat, 1999, 
Simon et al., 2005), 'human error' will not be analyzed as the first cause of the degradation of the 
situations, but as the symptom and the vector of the system malfunctions (Van Elslande, 2003). We 
will report it mostly afterward with the label of 'functional failure'3. That is for three reasons. At first, 
to distance itself from ambiguities of the notion of error in its common sense, often synonymic of the 
word 'fault'. Then, to target the analysis at the non retrieved errors, which are by definition those 
studied from accidents data. Finally, to include in this analysis the phenomena connected to 
capacities, notably physiological, of the individuals. In other words, this notion of function failure 
features the impairment of one (at least) of the cognitive, sensori-motor or psycho-physiological 
functions that usually allow the operator to adapt to the difficulties he meets when fulfilling his task. 
The notion of functional failure is thus useful to report the many levels of human dysfunctions: the 
error, the violation, the inaptitude. 
'Error' is by definition not deliberated. We do not make any mistake on purpose (or it is not really an 
error anymore). This question of intentionality led Reason (1990) to distinguish what concerns 'error' 
and what corresponds to deliberate unsafe acts. There would be an error only when the subject does 
not reach the purpose aimed during the execution of a strategic sequence of mental or physical 
activities, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of fate only. The notion of 
error does not thus cover all the forms of contribution of the human beings to the accidents. Unsafe 
acts, which are deliberately operated, are identified by this author as 'violations'. 
'Violation' is defined as the deliberated infringement (but not necessarily hostile, nor inevitably 
reprehensible from a legal point of view) of an established behaviour code or socially admitted to 
assure the safe functioning of a potentially dangerous system (Parker and al., 1995). In this 
explanatory system, it is also a question for extreme -even if they are rarer- deliberately criminal 
behaviours and those which have the will to damage: they are qualified as 'sabotages' by these 
authors. They match on the road those acts named delinquent, and which are different from the more 
'classic' road insecurity: Car chases, search for revenge, etc., which characterize certain atypical 
accidents. 
The notion of failure also allows to integrate more diffuse problems which are connected to the more 
or less durable inaptitude of the individual to realize his task and which can be a determinant link in 
the accident process: falling asleep, an illness, a impairment or an exceeding of the sensori-motor and 
cognitive capacities. 
3.3.2 Delineation of Human Functional Failure 
To make things easier, failures found in accident cases are delineated below in a 'Classification model 
for human functional failures in road accidents' following a sequential information processing chain of 
human functions involved in information gathering, processing, decision and action (Figure 5). It 
doesn't imply at all that drivers effectively function in a linear way. In the common functioning of the 
individual, there are numerous feedbacks between the various modules, and the data processing is 
                                                           
3 A glossary is presented at the end of the report. 
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strongly looped. But involving accidents as in the analysis which follows, we stop this functional 
buckle in the stage of rupture in the progress of the driver, as he is confronted with an unexpected 
difficulty which is going to lead him to lose the control of the situation which was more or less 
suitably regulated so far. It is thus a grid of analysis of the dysfunctions and not a model of 
functioning or dysfunction of the operator. 
At a general stage, the classification model allows distinguishing Failures at the information detection 
stage, Failures at the diagnostic stage, Failures at the prognostic stage, Failures at the decision stage on 
the execution of a specific manoeuvre, Failures at the psychomotor stage of taking action, and Overall 
failures dealing with the psycho-physiological capacities of the driver. At a more defined level (Figure 
6), it shows the specificities of the types of failures found in in-depth accident data. 20 precise HFF are 
so defined which gives an innovative view on the difficulties met by drivers on the road, notably in 
that it opens up the possibility of defining drivers needs in aid, where classical work on 'human errors' 
tends to finally conclude in the destiny of accidents simply due to 'human nature'. 
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Figure 5: General stages of human malfunction chain potentially involved in accidents 
 
 
By examining in detail In-depth data collected on accident scenes, the following types of functional 
failures can be defined with each of these categories. These failures are described, stage by stage, in 
the following pages. 
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Figure 6: Delineation of functional failures found from In-depth accident analysis 
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Failures at the information detection stage 
Perception (P) failures – Failures where, for some reason, the road user fails to detect another road user/hazard 
and therefore proceeds with manoeuvre, which leads to the impact. 
The safe performance of a task in a given driving situation depends in the first place on early detection 
of all the relevant data required for that task to be performed. If there is a failure in perception (?), this 
first human function will interrupt the good process of the entire human functional chain. For drivers 
in that situation, accidents are directly attributable to the non-detection (or belated detection) of 
certain essential parameters of the situation, such as a change in the way the site functions or the 
presence of another user on a potential collision course. These detection failures can occur following 
different types of mechanisms which go far further than strictly sensorial mechanisms. They can refer 
to problems relating to information conspicuity, a deficient organisation of information acquisition, or 
a failure to search actively for information. 
• P1 failure - Non-detection in visibility constraints conditions 
• P2 failure - Information acquisition focused on a partial component of the situation 
• P3 failure - Cursory or hurried information acquisition.  
• P4 failure - Momentary interruption in information acquisition activity 
• P5 failure - Neglecting the need to search for information 
Failures at the diagnostic stage (information processing stage 1)  
Diagnosis Failures – Evaluating and understanding the situation.  Once the detection stage is correctly 
performed, the road user will then need to process the information they encounter in a situation. 
Following a sequential logic of analysis for malfunctions, once the detection stage is correctly 
performed, a second functional stage involved in driving entails processing information acquired in 
the situations encountered. This processing activity should essentially enable the driver to: 
- On the one hand, evaluate the physical parameters (space, time, speed, acceleration, etc.) identified at 
the previous stage in order to assess the feasibility of undertaking his planned manoeuvre and,  
- On the other hand, understand the information acquired concerning the type of situation with which 
he is confronted.  
• T41 failure - Erroneous evaluation of a passing road difficulty 
• T2 failure - Erroneous evaluation of the size of a gap 
• T3 failure - Mistaken understanding of how a site functions 
• T4 failure - Mistaken understanding of another user's manoeuvre 
Failures at the prognostic stage (information processing stage 2) 
Prognosis Failures – Expectations of the road user. 
Given that it is an activity with a dynamic component, a second stage in the processing of the 
information acquired involves making a prognosis of its probable evolution (Hoc, 1996). At this stage, 
the driver has two tasks: on the one hand ensuring he correctly anticipates the potential changes in the 
currently encountered situations and; on the other making a prevision on the possibilities of a not yet 
visible event potentially occurring in situation to come. We will remind that beyond its direct 
intervention in the accident mechanisms such as they are analysed here, the prognosis function has an 
over determining influence on other functions, and by so, conditions more or less implicitly the whole 
process involved in a dynamic activity such as driving. To support this idea, Hollnagel (1991) 
describes prognosis function as a 'genotype' of many problems which will express itself in at the end 
of the functional chain by many different 'phenotypes'. 
                                                           
4 'T' accounts for 'Treatment of the situation', all failures of which involve Information Processing functions. 
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Three types of prognosis failures can be identified within the realisation of driving activity in 
accidental situations. The two first deal with the anticipation process:  the wrong expectation that 
another user won't move, and the wrong expectation that another user will regulate the situation. The 
third failure refers to the prevision process: the wrong prediction that no 'obstacle' will be met. 
• T5 failure - Expecting another user not to perform a manoeuvre.  
• T6 failure - Actively expecting another user to take regulating action.  
• T7 failure - Expecting no perturbation ahead.  
Failures at the stage of deciding on the execution of a specific manoeuvre 
Decision (D) failures – After undertaking the detection and information processing stages correctly, the failure 
occurs at the decision stage of the process.  The road user makes an ‘incorrect’ decision. 
Still following sequentially the grid of analysis of human functional failures, the functional stage 
resulting from the detection and processing of the event encountered consists of the decision-making 
processes that come into play. Since the driver gathered the right information items, since he has 
correctly interpreted the situation and anticipated its short termed evolution, he still has to 'select' 
amongst the driving strategies that are feasible in that situation the one that seems to him best suited 
to the event and its safety requirements. To the extent that the present analysis is focused on the 
problems that can put the driver into a situation of impeded progress, the failures outlined below 
relate to decisions to undertake a specific manoeuvre and not to the broader decisional factors related 
to the circumstances in which the journey is being made (alcohol intake, journey for recreational 
purposes, and so on), parameters which will be analysed as explicative elements for different types of 
failures. 
Contrary to the failures analysed until now, the malfunctions revealed in this type of process have 
more to do with the notion of 'violation' (Reason, 1990) than the notion of 'error' in information 
processing terms. As already stated, 'violation' in this context doesn't refer to the law, but to the 
informal driving norms socially shared.  Such 'violations' can be viewed as a deviation from the 
behaviours which could be expected from the majority of road users. Several types of failure in this 
decision-making function can be distinguished, according to the degree of intent involved in the 
violation committed: 
• D1 failure - Violation directed by the characteristics of the situation.  
• D2 failure - Deliberate violation of a safety rule.  
• D3 failure - Violation-error.  
Failures at the psychomotor stage of taking action 
Execution (E) failures when taking ‘Action’ - When the previous stages are all undertaken correctly, a failure 
could still occur at the psychomotor stage. The road user loses their ability to control their vehicle due to either 
external factors or being distracted by undertaking another task. 
The last link in the functional chain involved in driving activity is the driver's manipulation of the 
controls of his vehicle to ensure it continues along his chosen trajectory. This category only includes 
accidents in which a problem of vehicle control is the direct cause of the emergence of an accident 
situation, meaning that they occur after the driver has successfully negotiated the other stages. Note 
that these failures do not refer to the emergency stage but, as for other failures declined here, are 
analysed at the rupture stage. 
Two types of problems distinguish as the handling failure features an external element which comes 
to perturb the controllability of the manoeuvre (E1), or only the conditions of attention allocated to the 
task of trajectory regulation (E2). 
• E1 failure - Poor control of an external disruption.  
• E2 failure - Guidance problem.  
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Overall failures 
Overall or ‘General’ (G) failures - These failures involve several stages of the driving process, and the outcome 
will be that the road user will lose the capacity to fully control their vehicle. 
Until now we studied the failures corresponding to one or the other of the functional stages involved 
in the driving activity. However there are cases for which the problem does not settle anymore in 
terms of functions failure but in terms of capacities. It recovers the notion of 'overall failure which 
corresponds to a degradation of the whole functional chain, the outcome of which is a loss of control 
of the situation. These include those cases where the whole of the functions needed to drive seem to 
have been deficient in the mechanism leading to an accident.  
It is thus at the level of the general capacity of the individual to manage the situation encountered, as 
much from the point of view of the information to be collected, treatments to be operated, decisions to 
set, actions to undertake, that the problem is situated. Hence, the problem is located at the key level of 
the individual's general ability to handle the situations he encounters, with regard to not only 
information acquisition and processing but also the decisions to be made and the action to be taken. 
The origin of this overall failure is to be found in the parameters (factors) indicating the psycho-
physiological and cognitive state of the drivers scarcely compatible with the functional demands 
required by the general activity of driving.  These factors can refer to different things such as fatigue, 
alcohol or other drugs intake, fitness to drive, and so on. 
Three types of driving capacities degradation are listed in this category: the loss of psycho-
physiological capacities, the alteration of the sensori-motor and cognitive capacities, the 
overstretching of the cognitive capacities. 
• G1 failure - Loss of psycho-physiological capacities.  
• G2 failure - Alteration of sensorimotor and cognitive capacities.  
• G3 failure - Overstretching cognitive capacities.  
Such a classification, based upon in-depth analysis of the real difficulties encountered by drivers in 
accident histories, allows being well operational when trying to diagnose malfunctions in the purpose 
of promoting a safe driving system. 
To conclude with this analysis of HFF, it has to be well kept in mind that the clear finding of the 
human failure involves of course relying upon quality data collected by specialists in accident 
analysis, and notably involving verbal data collected by psychologists following a predefined 
protocol. This point seems problematic when conducting extensive in-depth data collection, 
sometimes more oriented to statistical purpose than really intensive research of the mechanisms 
involved. As a result, making use of data collected by non specialists in human factors (for example 
policemen records) will require a level of inference which does not guaranty the validity of the 
conclusions and, by so, their likeness depending on the analyst. For this reason, will be presented in 
Chapter 5 a more generic method allowing, not to precisely diagnose the failures and their factors, but 
to recognise the whole process of HFF generation by assimilation of the data to already defined typical 
HFF generating scenarios. This recognition method will be useful when working on large sample of 
accident cases put poorly documented on human factors aspects. 
3.4 Degree of the driver's involvement in the degradation process 
Complementarily to the diagnosis put on the functional failure, the variable 'Degree of the driver's 
involvement' defines the role played by each driver in the genesis of the accident. Close to the notion 
of 'responsibility', it differs nevertheless from this latter by the reference not to a legal code but to a 
strictly behavioural reference. An ergonomic approach of accidents, differentiating from the insurance 
and judicial perspectives, does not search for punishing but to preventing. It is not its role to attribute 
the guilt (which is underlined in the notions of 'responsible' or 'at fault' drivers); but to clarify the 
respective degree of participation of the various users involved in the same accident, from the 
viewpoint of the degradation of the situations. This will help defining whose drivers have to be 
helped and in which manner. Four modalities are so defined below which show in a decreasing way 
the degree to which the driver participates, through his behaviour, to the fact that the critical situation 
he met turned into an accident: 
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- Primary contributing (trigger) 
This modality designates the drivers who 'provoke the disturbance', but not on purpose. They have a 
determining functional involvement in the genesis of the accident: they are directly at the origin of the 
destabilization of the situation. Following the functional failure, the drivers provoke for themselves or 
for the other interfering users in the system, a critical situation in which the accident is going to take 
place. Examples include: a manoeuvre bringing the driver toward a trajectory of collision with the 
other, generating an unpredictable disturbance for the other users, provoking a loss of control, etc. In 
certain extreme situations, we can isolate two primary contributing drivers in the same accident, when 
they are both causative in the destabilisation of the situation (for example: when two drivers decide to 
overtake face to face on the third way). 
- Secondary contributing (contributor) 
These drivers are not at the origin of the disturbance which precipitates the conflict, but they are 
however part of the genesis of the accident by not trying to resolve this conflict. We cannot attribute 
them a direct functional implication in the destabilization of the situation but they participate in the 
non-resolution of the problem by a wrong anticipation of the events evolution. In situation of pre-
accident, they did not envisage a possible degradation of the events, although this degradation was 
theoretically detectable according to more or less alarming cues they had at their disposal. Potentially 
able to anticipate whereas they do not, they thus contribute to the genesis of the accident by the 
absence of adapted preventive strategies. Examples include: absence of behavioural adaptation 
because they expect an adjustment from the other user, no anticipation of a possible conflicting 
pathway with others although alarming indications, etc. 
- No contributing (but potentially reactive) 
These drivers are confronted with an atypical manoeuvre of others that is hardly predictable, whether 
it is or not in contradiction with the legislation. As a general rule, the human functional failure (HFF) 
observed among these drivers doesn't feature any endogenous (human) explanatory element. They 
are not considered as 'active' in the degradation because the information they had did not enable them 
to prevent the failure of others (contrary to the secondary contributing). They were not able to 
anticipate, due to this lack of information, the degradation of the situation, while the avoidance of the 
accident would have been possible in theory if this information had been supplied to them in time. 
But we differentiate them from 'only present' users, for whom no information would a priori have 
allowed to avoid the collision. Examples of 'no contributing' include: drivers confronted with visibility 
constraints, drivers that must face an atypical manoeuvre of others and who do not have warning cues 
at disposal, etc. 
- Neutral (only present) 
These drivers are not involved in the destabilization of the situation even if they are nevertheless an 
integral part of the system. Their only role consists in being present and they cannot be considered as 
an engaging part in the disturbance. No measure may a priori be beneficial to them, except to act on 
the other driver. That is why in an ergonomic purpose they are differentiated from 'No contributing' 
drivers. Examples include: drivers who are collided with when stopped at a traffic light or on a 
parking spot, drivers confronted with stone falls, etc. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Application of the classification model to in-depth accident data allows well précising the weak points 
in the driving functional chain where drivers can be subject to functional failures. Defining the degree 
of involvement from a behavioural (and not a legal) point of view allows going further in the 
understanding of the contribution to each protagonist in the accident production. Once the failure in 
the human functions allowing driving has been diagnosed, and once the level of contribution of each 
road user in the overall accident process has been defined, still have to be searched the reasons why 
the driver didn't succeed in compensating for the difficulties encountered. The definition of the factors 
of human failures which is presented in the following chapter will permit to find what has to be 
fought against in order to avoid human failure production, and by such avoid accidents to occur. 
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4 Classification grids of factors and situations for HFF 
(TRACE report D5.2) 
TRACE Report D5.2 describes the work undertaken for TRACE Work Package 5 Task 2, which aims to 
both determine the types and variations of potential factors which lead to the human functional 
failures that occur in road accidents, and also outline the types of pre-accident driving situations in 
which the road user is exposed to these factors. This work has been combined elsewhere with the 
work in the Work Package 5, to develop analytical tools for analysing human functional failures and 
typical failure generating scenarios in real-world accidents. 
It is generally acknowledged from a scientific view that the majority of road accidents are caused by 
not just one factor, but by the interaction of many different factors intervening at different levels, the 
one facilitating the other. Since the 1970’s, accident causation has become an increasing concern and 
many newly developed data collection systems and their databases now include accident causation 
variables, including factors which contributed to the accident occurring. But many accident causation 
systems currently focus much of their attention on the road user and their 'failures' which resulted in 
the accident occurring. By so doing, these 'errors' or failures are treated as the main cause of accidents, 
while the reasons behind them (i.e. the 'factors' of human failures) are often given little consideration. 
Also, 'factors' are often confused with their resultant 'failures' in the analysis of accidents. A review of 
literature and current accident studies confirmed that the problem with many accident causation 
coding systems currently used across Europe is that they do not separate the 'errors' (or human 
failures) from the 'factors' which lead to these failures. The grid of factors compiled in TRACE 
deliverable D5.2 aims to include only factors (not confusing with their consequences) and these factors 
can then be linked to the human failures investigated in D5.1 (cf. § 3), and be used to create 'scenarios' 
as part of D5.3 (cf. § 5).  
4.1 Methodological Approach 
To overcome the confusion of factors and errors that were found in the literature review, it was 
decided that a holistic approach would be adopted, enabling the analyst to look at the factors in an 
encompassing and complete manner. The approach enables many of the potential factors to be 
identified. However it is then necessary to apply a systematic approach in dealing with the factors that 
were generated in order to create categories or lists. The systematic approach allows the categorisation 
process to be consistent and thorough which can be particularly difficult when processing large 
numbers of factors.  
Using a holistic approach, the methodology of this task adopted a fundamental ergonomic model 
based on a model described by Eason (1981). The model is outlined in Figure 7 below: 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Fundamental Ergonomic Model (Eason 1981) 
 
This model is described in more detail in table 1 below: 
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Table 1 - Further Description of the Fundamental Ergonomic Model Outlined in Figure 2 
User (U) The individual involved and all of their personal demographic 
Task (Ta) The activity the user is attempting to undertake 
Tool (To) The equipment or devices the user is interacting with in the task 
Environment (E) The surroundings in which the user is carrying out their task 
 
This model was adopted to assist in a logical and practical method for generating a grid of factors 
which contribute to functional failures occurring and the related driving situations. 
When considering the driving situation, specifically in terms of accident analysis, the 'user', 'task' 'tool' 
and 'environment' can be interpreted in the following way: 
 
Table 2 - Adaptation of Fundamental Ergonomic Model for Use in Accident Analysis 
U = Road user A human in charge of a vehicle (e.g. driver, motorcyclist, cyclist) or 
pedestrian involved in the accident 
Ta = Task Driving, riding, walking, running... 
To = Vehicle A vehicle involved in the accident (e.g. car, truck, bus, van, 
motorcycle, bicycle…). Consideration should also be given about 
whether a pedestrian has an equivalent 'tool'? 
E = Environment Encompasses all aspects related to the road user’s surroundings (i.e. 
external to the vehicle and road user) 
 
In addition to the holistic approach, in order to further identify the factors, a top-down and bottom-
up5 approach was also taken using the sources of potential factors identified in the literature. To 
expand, a classification system was created based on those factors identified in the literature and 
using the categories defined, the many factors identified were sorted into these categories. Conversely, 
similar factors were grouped together and from these, an effective way of categorising was devised. 
The results of both of these methods were summarised and a comprehensive grid of factors which 
lead to human functional failure and categorisations was defined. 
The schematic in Figure 8 is divided into two parts, 'Pre-Accident Driving Situations' and 'Factors' 
which lead to functional failures. The pre-accident driving situation is related to the 'task' in Eason’s 
model and the ‘factors’ are related to the ‘user’, ‘tool (vehicle)’ and ‘environment’ from the same 
model. In addition to the task, the ‘driving situation’ is further defined by the location of the accident 
and any opponent manoeuvres from other vehicles in the accident (described as ‘conflict’ from here 
on). 
The concept outlined in the schematic also considers both ‘Current’ and also ‘Future’ issues. ‘Current’ 
issues describe the factors that are relevant in current accident analysis and are often considered in 
current accident data collection systems. The ‘future’ aims to describe potential ‘future factors’ which 
may not be considered in current data collection systems, but could contribute to functional failures in 
accidents as technologies and driving task demands change over the next 5-10 years (and may even be 
influencing current accidents) and may also affect the types of driving situations drivers are involved 
                                                           
5 Top-down - firstly formulating an overview of the system and then each subsystem is then refined in greater 
detail, until the entire system is reduced to base elements. 
Bottom-up – firstly the base elements of the system are formulated in detail and then the elements are linked 
together until the complete system is formed. 
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in. From the compiled categories and the generated list of factors, it became possible to identify and 
look ahead to ask questions like: ‘What factors are not considered in present classifications that could 
potentially be influential over the next 5-10 years, and would they still apply or fit with the current 
categorisation?’ The overall approach is outlined in full using the example schematic shown in the 
following figure: 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - Overall Approach for Determining Driving Situations and Factors 
 
To help focus on this holistic approach, each top level factor category was considered independently 
(User, Vehicle and Environment). Task was also considered in a similar way, but in order to define 
pre-accident driving situations. The following sections identify in detail how the holistic approach 
generated sub-categories and what factors were identified within each of these sub-categories.  
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As TRACE is focussing mainly on motor vehicles, in particular cars, the compilation of both the grid 
of factors and the pre-accident situations has also focussed mainly on motor vehicle drivers, in 
particular cars. Where possible, the involvement of pedestrians has been taken into consideration, but 
this is an issue that requires further in-depth investigation which is beyond the current scope of 
TRACE. 
4.2 Factors Leading to Human Functional Failure 
Human failures occur at the end of a dysfunctional process. They are explained by factors 
characterizing the state of the system, i.e. the defects of its components (human and other) and of their 
interactions. These factors form the explicative elements of the road users' incapacity to adapt to the 
situation in hand or to adopt a suited behavior. They are essential to be clearly characterized in order 
to find operational means to prevent the occurrence of human failures. 
In terms of road accident causation, a factor has been defined as ‘any circumstance connected with a 
traffic accident without which the accident could not have occurred’. However, this factor alone ‘is not 
sufficient itself to cause an accident’ (Baker and Ross, 1961). 
Depending on the specific accident scenario, the same factors can appear at different stages of the 
accident and may have different roles, being contributing, triggering, or aggravating factors to the 
process6. In the mentioned above D5.1 report, a division of the different phases within an accident 
scenario has been outlined and is reproduced in Figure 9. A specific factor could appear within any of 
these four phases and influence the likelihood of a functional failure, which occurs between the 
rupture phase and emergency phase. 
For example, a specific factor may already be present at the start of the ‘Driving phase’ (e.g. alcohol 
intoxication) and this would become a ‘Contributor’ when the ‘Triggering’ factor is introduced (e.g. 
encountering a difficult bend). The fact that the driver is ‘speeding’ when the bend is negotiated both 
‘Aggravates’ the likelihood of the functional failure occurring (e.g. poor control of the vehicle) and 
also the severity of the outcome (i.e. more severe injuries).  
However, in other accident scenarios where these similar factors appear, their role in the accident 
process may be different (e.g. the vehicle’s speed may be the ‘Trigger’ or ‘Contributor’ of the 
functional failure). 
 
Driving phase Behaviour on approaching the place Contributing factors 
 
  
 
Rupture phase Meeting an unexpected event Triggering factors 
 
Pivotal human functional failure in adapting 
to the unexpected event  
 
Emergency phase Avoidance manoeuvres and dynamic demands 
Aggravating factors 
(affecting emergency 
manoeuvre) 
 
  
 
Impact phase Nature of impact 
Aggravating factors 
(affecting accident 
severity) 
Figure 9 - Main Phases within an Accident Sequence 
 
                                                           
6 A definition is provided in the glossary at the end of the report. 
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As part of classifying factors which lead to human functional failure, three integrated levels of 
categorisation were developed, corresponding to the types of real world accident data commonly 
available to analysts. This would ensure the classifications were versatile and flexible enough to be of 
use in accident data analysis at different levels of detail depending of the data used. It is of course not 
worth to mention that the more detailed the data the more accurate the analysis will be. 
When using these factors as part of an analysis of real-world accidents, for each causal factor 
identified, it should be determined, if possible, whether each was a ‘contributing’ factor to the onset of 
the accident, a ‘triggering’ factor (i.e. led to the rupture phase), or an ‘aggravating’ factor (increased 
the likelihood of an impact occurring at the emergency phase), as outlined in Figure 9.  
To enable the comprehensive grid of factors to be used at all levels of analysis, three levels of 
classifications were developed for both user, vehicle and environment-related factors.  These levels 
were defined as ‘descriptive’ (see Table 3 below), ‘generic’ and ‘in-depth’ (see Table 11, Table 12 and 
Table 13 in Annex). 
 
Table 3 – General Classification of Factors 
1. Physical/ Physiological 
2. Psycho-Physiological Condition A. User State 
3. Internal Conditioning of Performed Task  
1. Little/None 
B. Experience 
2. Over- Experienced 
1. Conflicting (Distraction) 
User (U) 
C. Behaviour 
2. Risk Taking 
A. Road Condition 
B. Road Geometry 
C. Traffic Condition 
D. Visibility Impaired 
E. Traffic Guidance 
Vehicle (To) 
F. Other Environmental Factors 
A. Electro-Mechanical 
B. Maintenance 
C. Design 
Environment (E) 
D. Load 
 
4.2.1 User (Human) 
This category of factors is described as any factors related to the individual and personal 
demographic. This includes any physical (e.g. level of vigilance) and psychological (e.g. level of 
attention) states that may be of relevance, any psychomotor disorders that the user may have incurred 
through alcohol or misuse of drugs, or any emotional/motivational states unfitted with safe and 
efficient driving. The user is defined as any human in charge of a vehicle within the accident (e.g. 
driver, motorcyclist, cyclist) or any pedestrian injured in the accident, and is described as a ‘road user’. 
From reviewing the literature and current data collection systems, three main subcategories of user 
factors were decided on, as follows: 
1. User State 
2. Experience 
TRACE  D5.5 
 
Date of Delivery: 12-September-2008 - 26 - 
 
3. Behaviour 
Table 11 in Annex outlines the classification of road user-related factors which could potentially lead 
to functional failures. The three main categories of user factors defined (plus a number of sub-
categories) are outlined at different level of precision. These levels of classification must be used 
depending on the level of quality of the data at disposal.  
4.2.2 Environment 
The environment encompasses all aspects related to the users’ surroundings (i.e. external to the 
vehicle and road user). Six categories of environment-related factors have been defined and are 
outlined below: 
1. Road Condition 
2. Road Geometry  
3. Traffic Condition 
4. Visibility Impaired 
5. Traffic Guidance 
6. Other Environmental Factors 
Table 12 in Annex outlines in detail the classification of factors related to the environment.  
4.2.3 Vehicle (Tool) 
This category involves the equipment or devices the user is interacting with in the task. The 
subcategories developed to deal with the vast array of tools were: 
1. Mechanical – Vehicle failures which directly affects vehicle control; 
2. Maintenance - Anticipated vehicle fault, indirectly affects control of vehicle; 
3. Design - Design of vehicle affects safe/efficient operation; 
4. Load - Did a vehicle load affect ability to control vehicle? 
Further thought is needed to ensure that the ‘tool’ can be related to any type of ‘vehicle’ used on the 
road, including car, van, truck, bus, motorcycle, bicycle. Also, if this tool is also to be relevant for 
pedestrians, consideration must be given to what the ‘pedestrian’s’ equivalent ‘tool’ (vehicle) is? For 
example in OTS, ‘shoe’ is coded as the pedestrian’s vehicle. However, as TRACE is focussing 
specifically on motor vehicles, in particular cars, this should be a consideration for further work. 
Table 13 in Annex outlines the classification of factors related to the tool, which is defined as any 
vehicle involved in an accident (e.g. cars, trucks, buses, vans, motorcycles, bicycles etc…).  
 
It is envisaged that the grid of factors will be a valuable tool in TRACE, helping analysts determine the 
factors involved in accidents at a greater depth than other research studies have undertaken in the 
past.  It will also help to form a basis of the types of typical failure generating scenarios that have been 
investigated as part of Task 5.3.  The concept of the grid could also act as a valuable analysis tool 
beyond TRACE, not just for issues that are relevant in current accident analysis, but also issues that 
could potentially affect future accidents. 
 
4.3 Critical driving situations in which Human Functional Failures occur 
‘Factors’ were defined as being elements that ‘influence’ the road user’s ability to undertake the task 
rather than just the ‘causes’ of the accident. In the same vein, ‘situations’ were defined from an 
ergonomic point of view as being a task to perform at a given time within certain conditions, 
requirements and constraints (i.e. task demands).  
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These driving situations in which those factors intervene also have to be examined in order to better 
know the types of driving tasks in which difficulties are found by road users. In fact, HFF happen in a 
certain context which represents not only the task that road users had to perform (e.g. cross a 
junction), but also some constraints (potential 'conflicts') involved in this task performing (e.g. manage 
another car approaching). The different resulting 'malfunction tasks' (i.e. the tasks within which a 
malfunction occurred) are described through a classification grid of so-called 'pre-accident situations'.  
These pre-accident situations are essential to identify when analyzing road users' difficulties. They are 
defined below by: 1) the driving situation including the type of driving task being performed and the 
task location and 2) any potential ‘conflicts’ that the driver had to manage in order to perform the 
driving activity. In the diagram shown in Figure 9, the pre-accident driving situation can be defined as 
the ‘driving phase’ and describes what the road user was undertaking and the circumstances 
surrounding this prior to the rupture phase occurring. 
4.3.1 The driving situations 
A number of subcategories were initially developed to understand further the complexity of the driving 
task and these were related to the importance of the aspect of the driving task being undertaken. 
 
Table 4 – General Classification of driving tasks 
A.  Stabilised  Situation Going ahead 
B.  Intersection Situation On approach,  Stopped,  Going ahead, Turning 
C.  Manoeuvre Situation 
Overtaking, Changing lane, Slowing, Starting, Turning (not at intersection), 
Reversing, U-turn, In wrong direction 
D.  Other Situation Parked, Stopped in traffic queue, Pedestrian crossing, Railway crossing 
 
A. Stabilised Situations 
The situations defined in this category are those which do not occur at intersections and where no 
manoeuvres are being undertaken 
B. Intersection Situations 
They stand for situations which occur at or on approach to an intersection. An intersection is defined 
as a connection of two or more public roadways (i.e. a main road and at least one side road). These 
roadways do not include slip roads or private roads, driveways or paths. Intersection includes those 
controlled by ‘give way’ signs and markings, ‘stop’ signs and markings and those controlled by traffic 
light. 
C. Manoeuvre Situations 
These are situations where the road user is undertaking a specific manoeuvre which does not 
necessarily occur at an intersection (i.e. those already specified in the previous section).  
D. Other 
These are other types of situations which do not involve a specific manoeuvre and did not occur at an 
intersection (as defined in ‘B’). 
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Table 5 – Classification of driving situations (Manoeuvre and Location) 
Level 1 Level 2 
    A. Stabilised Situation 
Going ahead on a straight road 
Going ahead on a left bend Going ahead 
Going ahead on a right bend 
    B. Intersection 
Approaching a 'give way' intersection 
Approaching a 'stop' intersection 
Approaching a 'traffic signal' intersection 
On approach 
Approaching intersection where road user has right of way 
Stopped at a 'give way' intersection 
Stopped at a 'stop' intersection 
Stopped at a 'traffic signal' intersection 
Stopped 
Stopped in road/ turning lane waiting to turn 
Going straight on at a 'give-way' intersection 
Going straight on at a 'stop' intersection 
Going straight on at a 'traffic signal' intersection 
Crossing intersection where road user has right of way 
Travelling on roundabout (not turning on/off) 
Going ahead 
Travelling on slip-road (not turning on/off) 
Turning across traffic at a 'give-way' intersection 
Turning across traffic at a 'stop' intersection 
Turning across traffic at a 'traffic signal' intersection 
Turning across traffic from main road into side road 
Turning away from traffic at a 'give-way' intersection 
Turning away from traffic at a 'stop' intersection 
Turning away from traffic at a 'traffic signal' intersection 
Turning 
Turning away from traffic from main road into side road 
   C. Manoeuvre 
Overtaking stationary vehicle on left 
Overtaking stationary vehicle on right 
Overtaking moving vehicle on left 
Overtaking 
Overtaking moving vehicle on right 
Moved into lane on left (NOT overtaking) Changing lane 
Moved into lane on right (NOT overtaking) 
Stopping (not at junction) Slowing 
Parking (roadside) 
Starting (not at junction) Starting 
Leaving parking space (roadside) 
Turning across traffic from main road into private drive 
Turning away from traffic from main road into private drive 
Turning across traffic out of private drive 
Turning (not at intersection) 
Turning away from traffic out of private drive 
Reversing Reversing 
U-turn U-turn 
In wrong direction Driving in wrong direction (e.g. down a one-way road) 
    D. Other 
Parked Parked 
Stopped in traffic queue Stopped in traffic queue 
Approaching pedestrian crossing Pedestrian crossing 
Stopped at pedestrian crossing  
Approaching railway crossing Railway crossing 
Stopped at railway crossing  
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4.3.2 The potential conflicts to manage 
The grid of pre-accident situations was made complete with the inclusion of the potential ‘conflicts’ to 
manage in the driving situation. These potential conflicts are part of the pre-accident situation as they 
make part of the constraints that the drivers have to integrate in the performing of their task in the 
given location.  
Conflicts can be described as potential opponent manoeuvres that the road user could be faced with 
during the pre-accident driving situation. In most ‘situations’, each road user will not experience more 
than one conflict at the rupture phase.  
However, on some occasions, it is possible that more than one conflict could occur. However, it is the 
first conflict that led to the rupture phase which makes up the pre-accident driving situation that is 
described here. It is possible that this first conflict may involve a vehicle that is not involved in the 
eventual collision, so is not recorded in the accident (e.g. a vehicle swerves to avoid a stationary 
vehicle ahead but then eventually has a head-on impact with a vehicle travelling in the opposite 
direction). 
The following describes the types of conflicts which have been identified (outlined in Table 6). Again, 
two levels have been developed: 
Level 1 – Providing a basic level of information; 
Level 2 – Providing a more detailed level of information. 
 
Table 6 - Potential Conflicts That the Road User Could be Faced With During the Pre-Accident 
Driving Situation 
Level 1 Level 2 
None None 
Oncoming vehicle(s) in correct lane 
Oncoming vehicle(s) 
Oncoming vehicle(s) in wrong lane 
Moving vehicle(s) ahead 
Stationary vehicle(s) ahead (congestion or accident) 
Stationary vehicle(s) ahead (parked) 
Vehicle ahead  
(moving in same direction or stationary) 
Car door open on stationary vehicle 
Following vehicle(s) Following vehicle(s) 
Vehicle(s) from side road/path 
Vehicle from side 
Vehicle in lateral lane travelling in same direction 
Moving obstacle(s) ahead 
Obstacle(s) ahead (non-vehicle) 
Stationary obstacle(s) ahead 
Pedestrian crossing over 
Pedestrian walking along road Pedestrian in road ahead 
Pedestrian playing/ running on road 
 
The types of driving tasks, their location and the potential conflicts have been combined together to 
create a grid of pre-accident driving situations, which is displayed in Table 7. The user of the method 
therefore selects a row and column position to define the pre-accident situation. 
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Table 7 - Grid of Pre-Accident Driving Situations  
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5 An aggregation into typical HFF generating scenarios 
(TRACE report D5.3) 
The purpose of this third WP5 task conducted in the frame of TRACE was to build a methodological 
frame allowing the aggregation of accident data under the form of generic accidental processes. It is 
viewed as an integration of the parameters characterizing the accident generation dealing with human 
factors. These scenarios define common situations holistically in the difficulties encountered by 
different types of road users, in different types of situations with the contribution of different types of 
factors. The interest of such a preoccupation was confirmed by literature review showing an open 
field on methodological aggregation of accident data, notably if these data are wanted to be exploited 
in their richness and complexity. The method defined in this chapter is though to promote a new 
regard on the search for regularities in the accident production processes, going further than usual 
disaggregated analysis. This research can be viewed at two levels depending on the purpose of the 
study and the quality of the data used: 1) building the generic scenarios from in-depth studies 
involving human data collected by specialists, 2) recognising already defined scenarios from less in-
depth studies, at least not involving data collected by human factor specialists. 
5.1 The search for generic processes leading to human failure 
The overall purpose aimed at in the present section is to put forward recurring accident patterns 
showing a repetitive process that leads human to fail in its adaptation attempts. The term ‘typical 
scenario’ is used to designate a prototype of the accident process. This prototype is characterized by 
chains of facts, actions, causal relations and consequences. Typical accident scenario is an abstract 
construction, illustrating the main features of a series of similar accidents, and not the specific, 
concrete process of any one of these (Fleury & Brenac, 2001). 
The TRACE report D5.3 report (Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007b) proposes such a classification which 
tries to avoid the drawbacks of the two classical methods that are, one the one hand, statistical 
analysis –with the tendency of disaggregating data and loosing the notion of process, and on the other 
hand case by case analysis –which are difficult to generalize because of the specificity of each case 
when studied in-depth. This method makes use of the concept of 'typical scenarios' but focalising on 
the generic patterns of human failure-generating processes.  Accidents are the result of a process 
involving the various, more or less complex, malfunctions that occur in different driving situations, 
and which need not to be lost in the analysis. That is the purpose of the method proposed. 
This method takes the form of an integration of the results gained from D5.1 for the HFF and D5.2 for 
the factors and situations of these failures, inside Typical Human Failure Generating Scenarios 
(THFGS). The principle behind these typical scenarios is that they aggregate 'similar' processes, 
allowing to putting together different cases which are produced along the same chain of events, 
involving the same type of human failure and showing the same patterns of factors. The development 
of these scenarios has based on the analysis of accident cases from an intensive in-depth data bank 
involving detailed interviews of drivers involved done by psychologists (EDA from INRETS). 
The double operational purpose of these THFGS is:  
- To show the most occurring pathologies of the driving system that pushed the drivers' capacities up 
to their limits;  
- To open to the countermeasures efficiency, as far as these diagnosed generic pathologies are thought 
to be fought against by similar means. 
One methodological advantage is that, once their construction have been elaborated on the based of 
appropriate in-depth data, they can be recognised by similarity from less documented data. 
The current development of detailed databases collected on the scene of road accidents, notably at the 
European level (e.g. Safetynet project, the European Road Safety Observatory, etc.), puts back to the 
agenda accident classification works, and notably asks for an adjustment of the conceptions according 
to the progress of the knowledge on drivers functioning and the inscription of this functioning inside 
TRACE  D5.5 
 
Date of Delivery: 12-September-2008 - 32 - 
 
the overall accident process. The purpose of TRACE report D5.3 which is summarized here is to 
contribute to this objective as part of methodological advancements supported by TRACE project. 
A dilemma which is met in the exploitation of a set of descriptions of accidents results from the triple 
necessity of: 1) reporting the complexity of the phenomenon, 2) showing the variety of the 
circumstances of its occurrence, and 3) arriving nevertheless at results of a certain degree of generality. 
The present methodological work was devoted to the purpose of finding a way to overcome these 
difficulties, through the definition of typical human failure-generating scenarios showing the 
regularities behind 'human error' production.  
5.2 Interest of typical accident-generating scenarios 
The complexity of the phenomena in set in the production of an accident explains the difficulty 
finding a level of aggregation of the data that allows a classification of the cases integrating the 
sequential and interaction aspects of mechanisms involved. This complexity linking the elements 
constituting an accident is generally by-passed by considering only one moment of the accident 
process and/or separating the role of each participating elements. 
The purpose here is to go further in the understanding of accident generation. It is to define a level of 
description of the accident phenomenon intermediate between case study and the statistical analysis, 
and organized around the human component of the driving system. In fact the drivers are the micro-
regulating element of the system and they are the target of any safety measure. The generic 
configurations of human functional failure-producing described should help classifying accident cases 
in a more comprehensive way on the basis of recognition of the accident history.  
Indeed, in-depth case studies presents the advantage to precisely report every history of accident by 
integrating essential dimensions such as the dynamics, the sequentially and the multi-causality of 
mechanisms into play. But one of its inconveniences lies in the weak generalizing power of empirical 
data which stick too much to the 'real world', to the point to make of every accident a particular case 
only analyzable in an ad hoc way. In line with the complexity of the accident phenomenon, retaining a 
too important level precision for event description may compromise the comparison between different 
cases. 
By contrast, the interest of statistical analysis of accident data lies in the possibility of quantifying the 
importance of the problems on dimensions defined a priori, such as certain descriptive properties of 
the driver (age, fatigue, alcohol level, etc.) or of the environment (characteristics of infrastructure, 
weather conditions, etc.). It so allows estimating the interest of the actions to be led for an 
improvement of the road safety. However, the major inconvenience of this type of exploitation deals 
with the difficulty of reporting the complexity of the mechanisms of an accident from variables which 
are disaggregated, generally descriptive and loosened of any temporality. An analysis in term of 
statistical proximity allows with difficulty a real understanding of the processes of production of the 
accidents. For these reasons, we tried to find an intermediate level of analysis between case studies 
and statistical analyses, so as to integrate human factors into generic accident production processes. 
The huge variety of accident situations does not allow categorizing the accidents on the basis of 
exclusive criteria, as can been shown by contradictory results usually found in the literature, each 
result insisting on one aspect of the accident to the prejudice of the others. It is thus around these 
typical scenarios that we tried to build accidents profiles presenting a 'family look' from the point of 
view of the mechanism of 'human error' generation. The use of such typical scenario is thought to 
allow putting forward aggregation of accidents that are similar not only in their result but also in their 
progress.  
A typical scenario of accident is defined as the typical progress with which we can connect a group of 
accidents which present resemblances from the point of view of the chain of the phenomena, whether 
they are analyzed from an historical, a functional or a causal point of view (Fleury and Brenac, 2001). 
With regard to this overall conception, the specificity of the present analysis will consist in 
emphasizing the human component by defining scenarios of generation of human failure production. 
Moving the scope of analysis from the accident in general to driver functioning does not mean does 
not mean denying the pluricausal character of the accident. It is simply a question of decomposing this 
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multicausality to enlighten it under a particular angle: that of the cognitive processing which was not 
able to prevent the situation conditions from degenerating. The option taken for the analysis of the 
difficulties met by the driver is justified by the central position of this operator from the point of view 
of the micro-regulation of the road system. As stated in TRACE report D5.1, the driver is indeed not 
only a component of this system; he is above all the regulating element. It is by him that is going all 
the input and the output of this system, and he is for that the element to whom we tend to attribute 
causalities, sometimes abusively.   
5.3 Method  
A first phase of analysis consists of exploiting for every case individually, the totality of the 
information contained in every accident case, in order to identify the basic malfunction process in 
cause in the accident and all the parameters associated with it. Dealing with human factors, we will 
refer to the definition of HFF, the situation in which they are produced and the factors that lead to it, 
as described in the previous chapters. 
On this base of detailed analysis of in-depth data, we selected the generic parameters constituting the 
gist of the event and authorizing an aggregation of the accidents, pushing aside those who were too 
specific in every case to allow such an aggregation.  
The federative parameters used for the constitution of typical scenarios are the following ones (Figure 
10): 
- The task that the human function in question was intended to perform in the pre-accident situation 
(i.e. the outcome the driver wanted to attain and the constraints he had to cope with). The list of these 
'malfunction tasks' will be found in TRACE report D5.2 (Naing et al, 2007). 
- The combination of elements that most often explain the fact that the appropriate function failed in 
attaining the wanted outcome (i.e. the factors of HFF). The list of these explicative elements will be 
found in the same report as above (Naing et al, 2007).  
- The specific type of Human Functional Failure (HFF) which put the driver in a 'rupture situation', 
analysed through the classification model presented in TRACE report D5.1 (Van Elslande & Fouquet, 
2007a). 
- The action resulting from the HFF. This parameter points out the event (manoeuvre, action or none 
action) which the human functional failure led to (i.e. what did the driver do that he shouldn't, or 
didn't do that he should, as a consequence of this failure). 
- The crash configuration. This last parameter features the type of collision resulting from the 'HFF 
resulting action'. 
The building of these Typical Human Failure Generating Scenarios allows identifying recurrent 
mechanisms of malfunction production which tend to be more or less systematically reproduced, even 
if this systematic nature is not so obviously due to the complexity of the underlying phenomena.  
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Functional failure 
(At the 'rupture' in the driving situation)  
Resulting critical situation 
(Maneuver undertaken or continued) 
Pre-accident Situation  
(Describes the driving task pursued and its demands) 
Explanatory Elements : 
Endogenous 
(Originating within the driver himself) 
Exogenous 
(Arising from the environment) 
+ 
CRASH 
 
Figure 10: Structure of a typical failure-generating scenario  
 
Such an aggregating work has to be done on a case by case analysis. Depending on the aim of the 
study, it can be based upon different levels of data. For relating the general descriptive aspects 
involved in the accident process, data recorded by police services can be of use to build typical 
accident scenarios. However, when dealing with human factors, such data is not rich enough and far 
too much biased toward the research for responsibility. When dealing with human factors we need 
consistent human data. As for other domains, data collected on human must be based upon dedicated 
protocols performed by specialists of the domain. And the best way to put forward reliable results on 
human factors in accidents involves resorting to psychologists collecting data on the scene and 
analysing it with the help of appropriate models.  
In-depth data is then required to put forward typical human failure generating scenarios. Another 
possibility, if not having appropriate data at disposal, is to rely upon an already made classification, 
and then to work each case on the basis of similarity with one of the scenarios of the list. It is in fact far 
easier to recognize an accident process from the 'family air' of its story than to build the process from 
raw data.  
In order to allow accidentologists using data that doesn't fulfil these ideal conditions for analysing 
human failures (i.e. in-depth, involving psychologists), we decided to define the most frequent 
scenarios found in the study of a large sample of in-depth accident cases, on which to base in order to 
recognize the overall process. The TRACE D5.3 report describes the 'top 30' scenarios (Table 8) 
extracted from the intensive in-depth accident survey performed by INRETS (France) set up not only 
on the reconstruction of physical parameters but also on detailed interviews performed by a 
psychologist to apprehend the precise difficulties met by the drivers. These 30 most frequent scenarios 
have been built from an aggregation of the 1109 drivers on a total database of 1637 drivers for whom a 
function failure could be determined. These TFGS account for 67.7% of 1637 accident situations. So 
they can be considered as representing the most recurrent configurations found. These configurations 
can be recognized from less in-depth data by looking through the overall cases and finding similarities 
with the classification. 
In the report, the scenarios are described along a linear functional way: from problems of detection to 
'overall' problems as it formalized in the human functional failure classification model presented in 
Trace report D5.1 (Van Elslande & Fouquet, 2007). A good understanding of these scenarios requires 
study of this report, and also at the TRACE report D5.2 (Naing, et al, 2007) dealing with the factors of 
these failures and the situations in which they occur. 
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Table 8  - List of most frequent Typical Human Failure Generating Scenarios 
Categories of 
HFF 
Human Functional Failure (HFF) Typical Human Failure Generating Scenario 
'P1C': Road user surprised by a pedestrian or a two-wheeler non-visible when 
approaching  P1 failure - Non-detection in visibility 
constraints conditions 'P1D': Driver surprised by the manoeuvre of a non-visible approaching 
vehicle 
'P2A': Focalisation on a directional problem 
'P2B': Focalisation towards a source of information as a function of driver's 
layout representation 
'P2C': Focalisation towards a source of information regarding the importance 
of the traffic flow 
P2 failure - Information acquisition focused on a 
partial component of the situation 
'P2D': Focalisation towards an identified source of danger 
'P3A': Cursory search for information while turning on the left (on the right 
for left driving countries) P3 failure - Cursory or hurried information 
acquisition 
'P3B': Cursory search for information while crossing intersection 
P4 failure - Momentary interruption in 
information acquisition activity 
'P4A': Non-detection of the rapprochement from the vehicle ahead 
'P5A': Late detection of the slowing down of the vehicle ahead 
Perception 
 
P5 failure - Neglecting the need to search for 
information 'P5B': Late detection of a non-priority road user starting manoeuvre in 
intersection 
'T1B': Under evaluation of the difficulty of an although known bend 
T1 failure - Erroneous evaluation of a passing 
road difficulty 'T1C': Erroneous evaluation of a bend difficulty in a context of playful-
driving 
T2 failure - Erroneous evaluation of the size of a 
gap 
'T2B': Erroneous evaluation of a merging gap connected to the low attention 
paid to the manoeuvre 
T3 failure - Mistaken understanding of how a 
site functions 
'T3A': Mistaken understanding leading to a stopping failure in intersection 
'T4B': Mistaken understanding of the other's manoeuvre related to the 
polysemy of their signals 
Diagnosis 
(Treatment 1) 
 
T4 failure - Mistaken understanding of another 
user's manoeuvre 'T4C': Mistaken understanding of other's manoeuvre related to cursory 
processing of the interaction 
T5 failure - Expecting another user not to 
perform a manoeuvre  
'T5A': Expecting a non priority vehicle not to undertake a manoeuvre in 
intersection 
'T6B': Erroneous expectation of the stopping of a non priority vehicle 
approaching intersection T6 failure - Actively expecting another user to 
take regulating action 'T6C': Erroneous expectation of the stopping of a non priority vehicle 
coming on the trajectory 
Prognosis 
(Treatment 2) 
 
T7 failure - Expecting no perturbation ahead 'T7A': Expecting no vehicle ahead in a bend with no visibility 
D1 failure - Violation directed by the 
characteristics of the situation 
'D1A': Road user directed to go ahead in order to take the information 
D2 failure - Deliberate violation of a safety rule 'D2B': Overtaking on a zone with limited axial-visibility 
Decision 
 
D3 failure - Violation-error 'D3B': Going ahead at intersection being drawn into manoeuvre 
'E1A': Sudden encounter of an external disruption E1 failure - Poor control of an external 
disruption 'E1B': Sudden encounter of an external disruption, more or less expectable 
'E2A': Guidance interruption consequently to attention orientation towards a 
secondary task 
Execution of 
action 
 
E2 failure - Guidance problem 
'E2B': Guidance interruption consequently to attention impairment 
G1 failure - Loss of psycho-physiological 
capacities 
'G1A': Loss of psycho-physiological capacities consequently to a falling asleep 
or ill-health 
'G2A': Alteration of trajectory negotiation capacities G2 failure - Alteration of sensorimotor and 
cognitive capacities 'G2B': Alteration of guidance capacities 
General 
failure 
G3 failure - Overstretching cognitive capacities 'G3A': Overstretching processing capacities in traffic interaction situation 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The interest behind the simple definition of these typical scenarios is that they represent generic 
configurations which can be recognized even from less detailed accident data and even for non 
human factors specialists. In that purpose, they should contribute to the TRACE project by putting 
forward the regularities in accident processes from the angles of the different road users (Work 
Package 1), the different driving situations (WP2) and the different types of accident factors (WP3).  
It has to be kept in mind that such a formalization is dependant on the level of aggregation wanted, 
and the more numerous accidents will be studied the more aggregation work will be needed. Typical 
Human Failure Generating Scenarios must not be seen as rigid object, but rather as moving 'models' 
depending on the data at disposal and the objectives pursued. Particularly, when dealing with a 
specific thematic studies (e.g. elderly drivers, Powered Two Wheelers), these typical scenarios can be 
reviewed and refined in a way as better showing the specificities of the difficulties encountered by 
these elderly drivers or PTW riders, by highlighting in more details the accident configurations in 
which they are more typically involved. This doesn't mean that scenarios do not have the same 
validity from one study to other. It means that their level of 'granularity' may be adapted to each 
particular study. 
Of course, all accidents can't be aggregated into typical scenarios (unless becoming too general and 
loosing their operational utility). There are accidents which are more 'accidental' than others and for 
which the regularities behind their construction are not obvious. The effective purpose of this task was 
not the definition of a universal classification for every accident (this is more the objective of D5.1 and 
D5.2 classification grids). It is to help accident analysts at finding the most recurrent accident patterns 
showing a regular construction in the production of a human functional failure. These recurrent 
typical scenarios represent some more or less systematic 'pathologies' inside the driving system 
functioning. Once identified, they should be counteracted the same way by appropriate means.  
The method proposed and the most typical scenarios presented should promote a more 
comprehensive analysis of the inscription of 'human factors' in the accident production process. This 
analysis steers away from the road user being always the main instigator of the accident, but more a 
link in a causation chain. And by better understanding the malfunction process behind this causation 
chain, the typical human functional failure generating scenarios will offer a better assessment of the 
safety devices capacity to break this malfunction chain. By so doing, it can be considered as a valuable 
methodological contribution to the main objectives of the TRACE project. A case study demonstrating 
the use of these methodologies is presented hereafter.  
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Case study 
From an accident case collected in the frame of INRETS EDA in-depth study, the human functional 
failures, the explanatory elements and the driving situation can be figured and the typical scenarios to 
which the overall case belong is established, as well as the degree of participation of each driver. 
Summary of the accident 
On September 2006, around noon, the driver of an Opel drives in a secondary axis of the city centre. 
The weather is clear and the road dry. He stops by an intersection regulated by stop sign. He has to 
make a left-turn on a boulevard but having no sufficient visibility on the left, he moves his vehicle 
onto the stop line. He looks to the left, sees a Seat arriving from this direction on the boulevard 
Arnaud, then looks to the right, and finally crosses the intersection. While the Opel is completely 
engaged on the road, the driver suddenly notices that the Seat is close to him. He attempts an 
emergency manoeuvre but both vehicles collide in left front-side impact. Both drivers are slightly 
injured during this accident. 
Map of the accident  
 
 
Driver 1 (Opel) - Parameters to consider 
- 24 year-old man 
- Lives in the town 
- Congenital deafness 
- Has his driving license for 5 years  
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- Has to drive to a job interview and is just living the town to get there 
Driving phase: the driver is heading his appointment place (≈145Km further) and has to drive through 
the town to get there. Reaching the intersection, he stops at the stop line. Although there are visibility 
constraints (trees, advertisement and road signs) on his left, he sees the car coming from the left with 
right of way. 
Rupture phase: he thinks he has time to make a left turn and starts the manoeuvre. 
Emergency phase: while he is turning left he realizes that the other car is coming fast. He tries to 
adapt, turning a little bit larger than he had planned. 
Crash phase: the front of the car hurts his car on the left back side. 
 
Driver 1 (Opel) - Accident analysis 
- Human Functional Failure (cf. D5.1): T2 failure - Erroneous evaluation of the size of a gap 
- Explanatory elements (cf. D5.2):  
o Visibility: Road side objects 
o Experienced: Over-experienced of the place 
- Pre-accident Driving situation (cf. D5.2): Turning across traffic at a 'stop' intersection 
- Typical Failure Generating Scenario (cf. D5.3): T2 B - Erroneous evaluation of a merging gap 
connected to the low attention paid to the manoeuvre 
- Degree of participation (cf. D5.1): Primary active (the driver has generated the perturbation) 
 
Table 9  -  Synthesis for Road User 1  
HFF 
(D5.1) 
Explanatory elements 
(D5.2) 
Driving situation 
(D5.2) 
Scenario 
(D5.3) 
Participation 
(D5.1) 
T2 Visibility impaired 
by road side 
objects 
Over-experience 
of the 
environment 
Turning across traffic 
at a 'stop' intersection 
T2 B Primary 
contributing 
 
Driver 2 (Seat) - Parameters to consider 
- 30 year-old man 
- Lives in the town 
- Has his driving license for 10 years 
- Drives a rent car and is used to this practice 
- Comes back from work 
- Started at 5am but declares that he is not tired 
Driving phase: the driver comes back from work on his usual return journey. He had been working 
since 5am and has a physical activity but he declares he is not tired (practices boxing so professional 
activity fits with his expectations). He sees the non-priority car stopped at the intersection on the right. 
Rupture phase: he knows he has the right of way and consider that the other driver will not start his 
manoeuvre. 
Emergency phase: the non-priority car is turning left and he doesn’t have the time to stop as he was 
driving rather fast (60Km/h declared, 70-75Km/h reconstituted, 50Km/h limited). 
Crash phase: the front of his car crashes into the back left side of the Opel. 
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Driver 2 (Seat): Accident analysis 
- Human Functional Failure (cf. D.5.1): T6 - Actively expecting another user to take any 
appropriate regulating action 
- Explanatory elements (cf. D5.2):  
o Behaviour: Risk taking: Speed exceeding the practices and the rules 
o User state: Rigid attachment to the right-of-way status 
- Pre-accident Driving situation (cf. D5.2): Approaching intersection where road user has right-
of-way 
- Typical Scenario (cf. D5.3): T6 C - Erroneous expectation that the a non priority vehicle 
coming on the trajectory will stop) 
- Degree of participation (cf. D5.1): Secondary active (the driver participates to the non-
resolution of the problem by a wrong anticipation of the events evolution) 
 
Table 10  - Synthesis for Road User 2  
HFF 
(D5.1) 
Explanatory elements 
(D5.2) 
Driving situation 
(D5.2) 
Scenario 
(D5.3) 
Participation 
(D5.1) 
T6 Speed Rigid attachment to the 
right-of-way status 
Approaching intersection 
where road user has 
right-of-way 
T6 C Secondary 
contributing 
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6 Further upstream Social and Cultural human factors 
(TRACE report D5.4) 
The overall Work Package 5 of TRACE focuses on methodologies for the analysis of the human factors 
in accident causation. The aim of these methodologies is to go further in the understanding of the 
underlying causal chains involved so as to better define the appropriate means to help the drivers in 
their task. The above synthesized D5.1, D5.2 and D5.3 reports were specifically devoted to building 
operational models and grids for the definition of human failures, their factors and the conditions in 
which they occur. The D5.4 report related in the present section was intended to enlarge the question 
of human factors within a prospective work directed towards an integration of societal backgrounds 
in the accident causation process. These social aspects, whereas they are fairly never integrated in 
accident analysis, are important to consider as further upstream determinants.  
Factors such as culture, social status or specific social group membership have an identifiable 
influence on individual behaviour. The integration of such socio-cultural background variables in the 
analysis of human failure production has the potential to increase the understanding of the accident 
causation process and to find additional means to fight against. These aspects should notably be taken 
into account when dealing with driving aids, so as to appropriately answer the needs and constraints 
coming from different drivers' social groups. The objective D5.4 is to contribute to the definition of 
analyzing techniques promoting a systemic view on 'human factors' by giving a complementary input 
for a wider vision on accident causation factors going further upstream in the search for intervening 
variables. It presents a scheme of analysis built upon the notion of 'social spheres'. This scheme is 
aimed at showing the relative influence of the different layers ('spheres') of socio-cultural variables 
that are located outside the individual sphere and which are supposed to potentially have a latent or 
manifest influence on the production of an accident. After a general presentation of the relevant socio-
cultural variables to consider, the deliverable presents the possible application of the social spheres 
analysis scheme with the presentation of some accident case studies. This scheme is applied for 
practical developments in the operational Work Packages of TRACE (cf. D3.2 report Social and 
Cultural Factors, Engel, 2008). 
6.1 Accident causation in a Social Sciences perspective: individuals in their social 
context  
From a sociologic perspective, human beings are always social beings, existing and interacting in a 
given, specific social context. The scientific interest of this view relies in the understanding of human 
beings not only as individuals, but in their interaction with others and considering the cultural factors 
that predetermine their interactive behaviour. The objective is to understand what motivates human 
behaviour inside society and how social human beings orientate their behaviour from the others’ 
behaviour. 
The notion of spheres represents the dimensions that are usually related to sociological and psycho-
sociological7 analysis. These socio-cultural spheres aim to visualize the factors which are situated 
outside the individual, but which are having an impact on his individual representations, decisions 
and behaviour. Figure 11 illustrates the different spheres representing the different approaches of 
'human factors' analysis from the closer to the event to the wider:  
1- The analysis of operational interactions directly acting on the accident process 
2- The analysis of social representations governing individual attitudes and behaviour 
3- The analysis of social and cultural determinants of these attitudes and behaviour 
                                                           
7 Sociology and Social Psychology are two disciplines that interact very closely; the focus of Social Psychology is 
more on social representations and the influence of social factors on the individual. 
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A
Individual
B
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Interaction
Situation /
Specific context
Societal context
Structure of society 
Culture 
Social 
Representations 
 
Figure 11: The individual in its social context 
 
The objective of integrating wider socio-cultural factors is to understand human behaviour in its 
specific societal context. The notion of 'context' includes not only the situation in which the 
individuals interact, but also the broader frame, or social environment, that contributes to produce 
this specific situation.  
Economic factors, for example, constitute a given cultural background that conditions a common 
understanding of 'how best to behave' under specific circumstances. Let us consider that western 
societies today are very much influenced by a cultural paradigm which values 'quickness and 
effectiveness', and encourages efficient 'time management'. The social valorisation of 'time saving' may 
lead to develop a certain driving style, symbolizing to other people that you are in a hurry; you do not 
have time to waste, so you are socially adapted. Besides the 'technical' aspect of being considered as 
'more efficient', this behaviour has a highly symbolic content: your time is precious, which signifies to 
others that you are an important person. And your social status which integrates your eagerness in 
'being efficient' is symbolically transposed by your driving style, showing that you are an important 
person who has no time to waste. 
It is important to take into consideration that each individual is a product of the social influences he is 
integrating from his earliest stage of personal evolution, during the process of his socialization, 
specifically during childhood and as a young adult. The social environment which differs in several 
layers (or different spheres) is an integral part of the individual person, because it establishes a – 
variable – social context which functions as a 'navigation system', helping the individual to find his 
way in the social world, to make his choices and to orientate his behaviour. So it will condition 
drivers' behaviour and should be considered in accident causation analysis. 
6.2 Integration of socio-cultural dimensions in the framework of 'human error' 
analysis 
The question is the way to put forward an analysis framework where the sociological perspective 
could contribute to 'human error analysis' in a coherent way, bringing an added value for further 
accident causation understanding. As developed in TRACE deliverable D5.1, human 'error' or human 
'failure' is a transient link in a malfunction chain.  Reinach and Viale (2005), underline the relationship 
between 'downstream operator errors' and 'upstream contributing factors' such as supervision, procedures 
or organizational influences. Those upstream factors appeal to the sociologists understanding of 
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individuals’ characteristics, developed during the course of their lives, and which presents an 
incorporated socio-cultural capital that gives social identity and orientation on individual’s actions.  
Social beings are living in a social environment, and this environment is layered in several spheres of 
political, social or cultural dimensions, influencing themselves mutually. The 'social spheres' scheme 
invites to consider a broader definition of 'environment' as it is usually applied in accident causation 
analysis. The following paragraphs will develop the different layers of the 'social spheres analysis 
scheme', beginning with the individual sphere.  
- The individual sphere 
The individual sphere contains the social individual as a 'product' of sociological influences. For 
example, the individual person integrates a number of demographic variables; he is a man or a 
woman in a certain age with a specific educational background. He has specific experiences regarding 
driving, he has a specific social status that involves maybe a specific driving style and he could be a 
member of an informal social group with distinctive behaviour patterns that may have a distinctive 
part in the production of the accident.  
 
Driver
Vehicle A
Driver
Vehicle B
Relationship 
Interaction
“what happened?”
Environment
Situation /
Specific context
 
Figure 12: The driving environment  
 
- The social environment 
The idea of the multilayer system –referred as 'social spheres'- is an extension of the notion of 
'environment' that is used in accident in-depth analysis. The notion of the -social- environment 
presents the key dimension for the sociological 'upstream factors' scheme. 
Sociology perspective understands the 'social space' in the sense of a societal context that produces a 
specific environment, and the potential influences this environment may have on the individual. The 
road is actually a social space par excellence –possibly one of the most social places in today's life, a 
place where 24 hours a day individuals from the most diversified social backgrounds meet and have 
to interact (as drivers) together. There is also social setting inside the car with passengers interacting 
with the driver. By enlarging the 'field' of environment, can be explored factors which are acting prior 
to accident production. An individual driver is not 'neutral' when he causes or is involved in a road 
accident, he carries a lot of 'social luggage' with him; this 'social luggage' constitute in fact beforehand 
factors of behaviour, possibly acting in an accident causation situation. The driver is a product of a – 
unlimited – number of social factors and experiences that constitutes his individual person and 
consequently orientates his behaviour and interactions with the others.  
The road is an environment where the interactions between social individuals are highly dynamic. So 
the notion of 'environment' should be reviewed in the sense of enlarging it from the road to social. The 
notion of social 'space' includes the specific connotations that each actor is involved differently 
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according to the specific expectations he has towards the socially constructed environment, and 
assuming what expectations the other actors of the road have towards him.  
The social space presents an extension to the 'human error' model as presented in the chapters above, 
as a complementary analysis frame: the social space is the dimension where socio-cultural dispositions 
manifest later in specific decisions and so into actions.  
The definition of 'environment' for the social spheres scheme consequently should enclose:  
 The understanding of the road as a place of social interaction according to formal, codified 
rules, informal rules and conventions 
 The other drivers or passengers 
 The other participants of the road (e.g. pedestrians, animals) 
 The social space or social context: what are social expectations towards a specific environment  
Driver
Vehicle A
Driver
Vehicle B
Relationship 
Interaction
“what happened?”
Environment
Situation /
Specific context
Social expectations 
Codified rules
Social Expectations towards design,
Urban space, etc
2 W
Pedestrian
Pedestrian 
Driver
Y
 
 
Figure 13: A broader understanding of environment 
 
6.3 The multilayer spheres of sociological dimensions 
The influences of the 'social environment' at the site of the accident now must be clarified regarding 
their direct impact on the accident production, or their more latent effects lying in socio-cultural or 
ethnological dimensions.  
The 'social spheres' scheme objective is to propose a virtual map, which helps to locate and to connect 
the socio-cultural dimensions that are influencing the individual behaviour and so co-generate –going 
through the 'human error'- the accident as an outcome of a specific situation.  
The wider levels of sociological dimensions integrate a number of dimensions that influence the 
individual level. In D5.4 TRACE deliverable, are presented the different dimensions which are 
relevant regarding their potential impact on the individual sphere, each dimension being is defined on 
behalf of its formal content and characteristics, as well as its potential impact on individual 
representations, decisions and resulting behaviour. In fact, different levels of upstream factors have to 
be distinguished according to their mutual impact. In the 'social spheres' scheme, three 
multidimensional social spheres will be distinguished interacting with each other. From the outer 
sphere to the individual sphere, there appear: 
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1. The Normative sphere (prescription and social structure) integrates: 
a. A formal structural level that integrates the dimensions of the law (the legal 
background), the normative system. 
b. An informal level that integrates customs and conventions; 
c. A level of culture, or the 'cultural bias'. 
 
2. The Reference Sphere (direct social interference) corresponds to:  
a.  A level that integrates dimensions of social conditions and / or social status that 
contribute to the social identity of the individual driver; the notion of habitus.  
b. A level that we want to qualify as 'membership' to a distinctive culture or subculture,  
c. Membership to an ethnic group, cultural backgrounds or age cohorts.  
d. Socio demographic factors (gender, profession, etc.) 
 
3. The Context sphere (social situation, social space) integrates the specific social context of 
the accident causation situation, as well as further dimensions related to the implicated 
individuals 
a. Social expectations towards the presumed role of the 'others' 
b. Social expectations towards oneself ('expectations of expectations')  
c. Trip related information (urban structure, trip characteristics, etc)  
 
4. The individual sphere, home of the 'human error' – here the upstream layers potentially 
impact on the individual decision making process and the behavioural outcome. 
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 Figure 14: The different layers of the social spheres 
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6.4 The social spheres analysis scheme  
Figure 15 shows the social spheres analysis scheme completed with the different socio-cultural 
variables according to each layer social and cultural variables. The method to understand such 
different spheres of variables is then proposed. 
 
 
Figure 15: Dynamics of the social and cultural variables which constitute the 'social spheres' 
 
In order to show the benefit of this analysis tool inside accident causation analysis, the D5.4 report 
gives example of practical application of the 'social spheres' scheme.  
The practical application of the analysis scheme is twofold:  
1. A tool for location of the human accident causation factor, 
2. The construction of a social identity card for establishing social profiles on accidented drivers.  
The benefit of the 'social spheres analysis scheme' is projected essentially in identifying predictors 
regarding socio-cultural impacts on human behaviour, notably upon which to base for defining 
prevention strategies.  
Regarding the research aspect, the 'social spheres' present an investigation tool for usage in the 
framework of the in-depth accident interviews. In further generations of in-depth studies, the multi-
dimensional variables from the 'spheres' can be formalized for statistical analysis.  
6.4.1 The 'social spheres analysis scheme' as a tool for location of the human accident 
causation factor 
The logic of the 'social spheres' is to give access to potential accident causation factors which are 
situated outside the individual sphere, where the 'human error' is analyzed, and so render visible 
upstream factors that can have an impact on the accident causation process.  
For example an accident resulting from 'drink driving', following a combination of social influences 
(reference group, specific cultural context) the main cause for the accident is situated outside the 
individual sphere, even if the individual was subject to a certain failure (of decision, of behaviour) at a 
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Cultural Bias 
“Speed culture”
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given moment of the accident process. The determining factors for the accident outcome were already 
prepared far ahead in the specific socio-cultural settings that led the individual to decide to consume 
alcohol. 
An example could be the following: a male driver, 43 years, sales manager who drives - neglecting the 
speed limit - after a business lunch with alcohol consumption has an accident. What are the accident 
causation factors? From the perspective of the 'social spheres' scheme, the accident causation factors 
are situated in the reference sphere, the person responding to socially expected behaviour due to his 
social position and professional role, which implies a specific habitus regarding socio-professional 
situations including his driving style. To predict the potential outcome, the analysis should focus on 
the social frame and the social conventions before the person takes the wheel, the 'human error' he 
will commit being only the trigger of the malfunction social process.  
 
1 2
5
5
3
4
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Infrastructure
vehicle 
conventions
reference groupage
gender 
socio prof status 
 
Figure 16: An example of location for ' drink driving ' according to the social spheres analysis 
framework 
 
6.4.2 Proposal for a social identity card and its application  
A further application of the 'social spheres' scheme is the social profiling of drivers which are involved 
in an accident. The principle is not to define risk groups in the sense of stereotyping or stigmatizing 
individuals regarding their specific personal background, but merely to collect relevant background 
information on what is the socio-cultural context of some accident scenarios. The utility behind 
collecting such information shall be looked into the capacity of adjusting safety measures (including 
the introduction of electronic safety functions) as a consequence. 
Typically, the social identity card (Figure 17) would be part of the interview protocol conducted in the 
frame of in-depth accident studies, and so integrates the socio-cultural background information in the 
interview process. The objective of the social identity card is about systematically collecting driver 
information that contributes to establishing hypothesis on potential influences of social and cultural 
factors. Based on the information collected, the card can help to establish hypothesis regarding the 
social and cultural factors and contributes to explain the accident causation process and gives a better 
identification of specific countermeasures. In addition to the objective of a larger human factor 
analysis frame, the social spheres scheme presents a tool for comparative analysis in an international 
context.  
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Age Gender 
Socio-
professional 
status 
Education 
     
Accident scenario 
 
Membership 
       
Peer Group 
        
Trip related 
information 
        
Habitat 
        
Observations 
 
 
Figure 17: Social identity card 
 
The following card is the translation of the 'drink driving' case presented above.  
Professional trip, countryside; after business lunchTrip related 
information
92
Paris, suburbsHabitat
The person actually follows a training for driver’s permit point recuperation
RecidivistSpeed cultureGeneral 
Management
Peer Group
membership
Speed, drink driving
Bac + 3Manager
(sales director)
M40-49
educationsocio-prof.Gender Age 
 
Figure 18: An example of 'drink driving' for illustration of the social identity card 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this TRACE 5.4 report, a proposal for a larger perspective on human factors related accident 
causation analysis was introduced. The approach via a 'social spheres analysis scheme' is designed to 
visualize latent social and cultural factors, which are potentially affecting individual decisions and so 
behaviour.  
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The 'social spheres' is a tool that allows locating the socio-cultural influences outside of the individual 
sphere. This tool is supposed to enhance accidentologists’ sensitivity to such potential influences for 
the benefit of the accident causation analysis procedure and of the definition of appropriate 
countermeasures. Such social variables must be notably taken into account when introducing more or 
less compulsory electronic devices, to guaranty a better acceptance by a better appropriateness to 
social patterns.  
Especially in the context of an evolving European Community, the aspect of comparing the different 
societal and cultural backgrounds is an important challenge for further accident causation research, 
the understanding of socio-cultural differences being a key issue for future European road safety 
governance. However, the field of accident causation research has to evolve towards more 
interdisciplinary approaches and new -especially 'soft'- sciences approach must be integrated step by 
step.  
The present methodological contribution to Work Package 5 of TRACE European project adds a 
complementary view on human factors inside the accident causation process by putting the individual 
in a larger framework of socio-cultural influences. The presented approaches allows the integration of 
a more complete view on additional accident mechanisms which are generated outside the individual, 
and can so help to improve accident data collection and its interpretation for future research. This 
method developed will be applied inside Work Package 3, which is dedicated to the operational 
analysis of Accident Factors. The confrontation of the methodological framework with accident data 
will allow defining in a more practical way the use of the 'social identity card' in the frame of in-depth 
accident analysis.  
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7 Conclusions 
Accident causation is part of these domains that seems misleadingly simple, nearly obvious. It is thus 
often assumed that there is one cause or one responsible for an accident and that it would just take 
determining that cause or this responsible, suppressing the first and punishing the second, to prevent 
the accident occurring. Maybe such a view had reached a relative validity in the old times of the 
driving system when monolithic defects were easy to diagnose. However, it is less and less proving to 
be efficient as the system is continuously improving on the basis of research and developments 
addressing the different components involved. The problem is that, more and more, a cause becomes 
a cause only if it combines with several other hidden ones, and the so considered 'responsible' is more 
and more the heir of the influence of these combination of factors intervening in the driving 
interactions. Road safety of the 21st century has become a matter of complexity, apart from some 
residual extreme cases showing atypical accident patterns (e.g. involving big holes on the road, 
breakdown of the car brakes, aberrant drivers' behaviours). In order to go on improving safety of the 
driving activity, it has become essential to study this complexity. And the more we will gain in safety, 
the more thorough research works will be necessary to go on progressing.  
The European TRACE project is turned toward developing a better understanding of accident 
causation, in order to reach the definition of more appropriate measures, involving notably electronic 
safety functions, possibly able at preventing it. Along this objective, Work Package 5 'Human Factors' 
of this project has been designed to contribute to the development of a deeper analysis of the 
difficulties encountered by the human component, the road user, in order to promote an improving of 
the driving system which is put at his disposal. The work done in TRACE WP5 has led to several 
operational grids of analysis, in line with theoretical models, which offer a means to progressing in the 
conceptions regarding the human role in accident generation, and in the methods allowing to better 
diagnosing the causes of human errors, violations, and capacity exceeding. The underlying conception 
behind these grids is oriented toward a 'safe system model' reminding that the purpose of any device 
dedicated to a human use should be conceived and built in a way of neither being problematic nor 
dangerous for its users. So should be the driving system. 
In a first step, a grid has been elaborated for analysing the operational difficulties that human beings 
can find in driving, potentially resulting in accidents. This grid delineates so-called 'Human 
Functional Failures' (HFF) representing the weaknesses and limits in adaptive capacity of the human 
functions (perception, comprehension, anticipation, decision, action) to which drivers appeal in order 
to drive efficiently. And as far as an accident is not intentional for anyone (otherwise it is no more an 
accident) each HFF is considered as the result of a malfunction characterizing the driving system as a 
whole. It is a symptom which manifests a wrong interaction between a road user and his driving task 
environment. Human failure shall not be considered –whereas it is often the case- as the cause of the 
accident but rather as a weak link in a malfunction chain, this chain being necessary to find out if any 
efficient solution is thought to be defined. Thus, once a human functional failure is diagnosed, it still 
has to be defined which factors and which contexts have originated it. 
The problem with many accident causation coding systems currently used across Europe is that they 
do not separate the ‘errors’ (or human functional failures) from the ‘factors’ which lead to these 
failures. The second step of the methodological work consisted in building a grid allowing the 
determination of all the elements (factors) -would they be referring to the road layout, the vehicle 
parameters, the driver or the traffic surrounding-  that could originate or favour a Human Functional 
Failure, not confusing these factors with their consequences. A complementary grid also provides a 
classification of 'pre-accident driving situations' in which human failures occur. These pre-accident 
driving situations are built from a combination of: 1- the types of driving tasks (e.g. overtaking, 
crossing, turning), 2- their location (e.g. intersection, straight road, roundabout) and 3- the potential 
conflicts met in the situation (e.g. pedestrian crossing, oncoming vehicle, car door opening). The 
precise characterisation of these pre-accident situations in accident studies allows definition of the 
circumstances in which road users find difficulties.  
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A third step of this methodological work consisted in providing a method allowing the aggregation of 
similar accident processes on a multidimensional level (a scenario). The method consists in building 
typical scenarios of human failure production, integrating the elements studied in the previous steps. 
The Typical Human Functional Failure Scenarios represent the regularities which can be found in the 
process governing similar accidents. They are expressed under the shape of chains which connect a 
pre-accident situation, explicative elements involved, a consequent human functional failure and a 
resultant critical situation leading to a crash configuration. But a main difficulty in the determination 
of all these detailed variables is the necessity to base them upon in-depth accident data performed by 
specialists in the different domains. In order to allow accidentologists using data that doesn't fulfil 
these ideal conditions (i.e. in-depth, involving psychologists), we have defined the most frequent 
scenarios found in the study of a large sample of in-depth accident cases, on which to base in order to 
recognize the overall process on a 'family air' basis, which can be done from less in-depth data.  
A last methodological work performed in TRACE WP5 is differentiating from the previous ones in its 
more prospective purpose. It was aimed at enlarging the classical view on driving behaviour 
determinants by incorporating the social and cultural dimensions as further upstream factors of 
human functional failures. Factors such as culture, social status or specific social group membership 
have an identifiable influence on individual behaviour. It presents a scheme of analysis built upon the 
notion of 'social spheres'. This scheme is aimed at showing the relative influence of the different layers 
('spheres') of socio-cultural variables that are located outside the individual sphere and which are 
supposed to potentially have a latent or manifest influence on the production of an accident. The 
integration of such socio-cultural background variables in the analysis of human failure production 
has the potential to increase the understanding of accident causation process and to find additional 
means to fight against. These aspects should notably be taken into account when dealing with driving 
aids, so as to appropriately answer the needs and constraints coming from different drivers' social 
groups. 
The different deliverables synthesized in the present report have been provided with the aim to 
progress in the search for understating accident causation and its underlying and upstream 
determinants. As such they contribute to the European TRACE project objectives of promoting a 
scientific knowledge on accidentalness so as to better defining the safety measures able reducing it. To 
this respect, the overall point of WP5 is to remind that the road user is the core of the driving system, 
and human performance the measure of its effectiveness. That is why possible human failures must be 
in-depth studied, their causes and producing contexts clarified in order to put forward the most 
efficient measures able at harmonizing human travelling behaviour inside the traffic system. Could 
the methods proposed as regard as 'Human Factors' act in such a way by allowing a more integrative 
approach inside accident research in Europe. This is being done in numerous studies conducted in 
TRACE operational work packages, addressed to the different roads users groups (elderly drivers, 
PTW, passenger cars, gender issue, etc.), to the main identified driving situations (intersection, specific 
manoeuvres, degraded situations, etc.) and to the most involved factors (vigilance, attention, 
experience, infrastructure, etc.). These different studies will make us progressing on the 
understanding about human factors in accident causation and the necessity to develop a safe system 
well addressed to human needs. And the 'human factors' methods put forward in TRACE WP5 should 
be constructive to base the building of a comprehensive European road safety observatory. 
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Glossary  
 
Active failure pathway. In Reason's model, the way that facilitates the occurrence of errors and 
violations in the system process. 
Aggravating factors. Elements that impede the capacity of the road user to avoid the crash during the 
emergency phase (e.g. insufficient verge width) or increase the likelihood of morbidity during the 
impact phase (e.g. rigid obstacle along the road). 
Cognitive functions. Mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning (in contrast 
With emotional and volitional processes) which enable the individual to understand and interact with 
his environment. 
Contributing factors. Elements characterizing the driving phase, which will favour the future 
degradation of the situation (e.g.  infrastructure inducing speed) 
Crash phase. The crash phase comprises the crash and its consequences. It determines the severity of 
the accident in terms of material damage and bodily injury. 
Decision stage. Once the driver gathered the right information items, has correctly interpreted the 
situation and anticipated its short termed evolution, he still has to 'select' amongst the driving 
strategies that are feasible in that situation the one that seems to him best suited to the event and its 
safety requirements. At this stage, the failures relate to decisions to undertake a specific manoeuvre 
and not to the broader decisional factors related to the circumstances in which the journey is being 
made (alcohol intake, journey for recreational purposes, and so on). 
Detection / Acquisition stage. It deals with a specific moment of information processing when the 
subject is trying to collect all the relevant clues required for the task to perform. Detection failures can 
occur following different types of mechanisms which go far further than strictly sensorial 
mechanisms. They can refer to problems relating to information conspicuity, a deficient organisation 
of information acquisition, and a failure to search actively for information. 
Diagnostic stage. At this stage of information processing the road user 1) evaluates the physical 
parameters (space, time, speed, acceleration, etc.) identified at the detection stage in order to assess the 
feasibility of undertaking his planned manoeuvre and 2) understands the information acquired 
concerning the type of situation with which he is confronted. 
Driving phase. It is the situation in which the user is before a problem arises. It is the 'normal' 
situation, which is characterized for the driver by the performances of a specific task in a given 
context, with certain objectives, certain expectations and so on. 
Emergency phase. IT is the period during which the driver tries to return to the normal situation by 
carrying out an emergency manoeuvre. 
Error (for ergonomics). Undesirable result of interaction between an operator and a task, arising from 
an interaction between internal and external determinants 
Error factor. It deals with the explanation of the human error and covers internal elements (vigilance, 
experience, distraction…) as well as external ones (traffic condition, layout parameter, vehicle 
defect…). It is essential to put them in evidence if we want to understand the origin and the process 
that conditions the error. 
Handling stage. The stage involves the driver's manipulation of the controls of his vehicle to ensure it 
continues along his chosen trajectory. Failures classified in this category only include accidents in 
which a problem of vehicle control is the direct cause of the emergence of an accident situation. It 
implicitly means that they occur after the driver has successfully negotiated the other stages. 
Heuristic. A rule of thumb, simplification, or educated guess that reduces or limits the search for 
solutions in domains that are difficult and poorly understood. Unlike algorithms, heuristics do not 
guarantee optimal, or even feasible, solutions and are often used with no theoretical guarantee. 
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Human error. Failure of the operator's attempt and/or capacity to adjust his activity, in terms of being 
able to successfully adapt to the difficulties encountered in task performance conditions 
Human factor. Every parameter connected to human state and condition which has a role at one or 
another stage of the accident process.  
Human Functional Failure (HFF). Define the failures of the human functions which usually allow the 
road user to adapt to the difficulties of the driving task. The HFF is described as the consequence of a 
gap between the requirements of a task and the capacities of an operator to face it, this gap resulting 
from the combined influence, and mostly inseparable, of the internal conditions characterizing this 
operator and external conditions to which he is confronted in the realization of his activity. 
Latent failure pathway. In Reason's model, the way of not protecting operators against their potential 
errors. 
Overall failure. It covers the notion of general failure which corresponds to a degradation of the 
whole functional chain, the outcome of which is a loss of control of the situation. These include those 
cases where the whole of the functions necessitate to drive seem to have been deficient in the 
mechanisms leading to an accident. 
Prognostic stage. At this stage, the driver has two tasks: on the one hand ensuring he correctly 
anticipates the potential changes in the currently encountered situations and; on the other hand 
making a prevision on the possibilities of a not yet visible event potentially occurring in situation to 
come. 
Rupture phase. The rupture is an unexpected (for the road user) event that interrupts the driving 
situation by upsetting its balance and thus endangering the system. 
Triggering factors. Elements directly generating the rupture phase through the production of a 
human functional failure (e.g.  Stop line erased) 
Violation. A more or less deliberate deviation from the practices socially considered necessary for 
ensuring the safe functioning of a potentially dangerous system (must not be confused with 
'infringement, referring to a strictly legal norm, and are more police matter than researchers' ones). 
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Annex 
 
 
Table 11 – Grid of User Related Factors Which Could Lead to Human Functional Failures 
Descriptive Generic In-depth Examples 
Medical 
condition 
Heart condition/Epilepsy/Other brain 
condition/Respiratory condition/Blood 
condition/Other condition 1. Physical/ 
Physiological 
Pre-existing 
impairment 
Hearing/Visual/Physical disability/Other 
impairment 
Substances 
taken - alcohol 
Above ‘legal’ limit/ 
Below ‘legal’ limit 
Substances 
taken - drugs 
Illegal drugs/ 
Correctly used medication/ 
Misused medication 
Emotional 
Upset/Angry/Anxious/Happy/Other 
emotion 
Fatigue Physical/Mental 
2. Psycho-
physiological 
condition 
In a hurry In a hurry 
Right of way 
status 
Rigid attachment to the right of way status 
Excessive 
confidence 
Excessive confidence in signs given to others 
A. User State 
3. Internal 
conditioning of 
performed task 
Identification of 
potential risk 
Identification of potential risk about only 
part of the situation 
Driving 
Learner/New driver/Infrequent 
driver/Other 
Route 
New route/Road type/New road/Road 
feature/Driving on the left/Driving on the 
right/Other 
Vehicle 
New vehicle/ 
Transmission type/ 
Left hand drive vehicle/ 
Right hand drive vehicle/ 
Other vehicle feature 
1. Little/None 
Environment 
Night driving/City driving/Country 
driving/Driving in snow/Driving in 
fog/Driving in wet or flood/Driving in 
ice/Other 
Driving Change in driving rules/Other 
Route 
Route in general/Road type/New 
road/Road feature/Other 
B. Experience 
2. Over-
experienced 
Vehicle New vehicle/ 
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Transmission type/Other vehicle feature 
  Environment 
Night driving/City driving/Country 
driving/Driving in snow/Driving in 
fog/Driving in wet or flood/Driving in 
ice/other 
Distraction 
outside vehicle* 
Police/Animal in road/ 
Sunlight or sunset/ 
People in roadway/ 
Crash scene/Other perceived danger/Road 
construction/ Searching for directional 
information/ 
Unspecified outside distraction 
Distraction 
within vehicle* 
Adjusting radio/  
Adjusting cassette/ 
Adjusting CD/ 
Other occupant/ 
Moving object in vehicle/ 
sing or viewing device integral to vehicle/  
Using other device brought into vehicle/ 
Adjusting climate controls/ 
Eating/Drinking/ 
Cell phone/ 
Smoking/ 
Looking inside vehicle/ 
Reaching for object/ 
Unspecified inside distraction 
1. Conflicting 
(Distraction)  
Distraction 
within user* 
Lost in thought/ 
Medical problem 
Speed 
Illegal/Legal but 
inappropriate/Erratic/Other 
Vehicle 
positioning 
In front/Lateral/Other 
Traffic control 
Signs disobeyed/Signals disobeyed 
/Markings disobeyed/Other 
C. Behaviour 
2. Risk taking 
‘Eccentric’ 
motives 
Testing a vehicle/Thrill-
seeking/Competing/’Stunt’/Unspecified 
eccentric motives 
* The distractions described at an ‘in-depth’ level are based on the sources of distraction described by Stutts et al. 
(2001)  
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Table 12 - Grid of Environment Related Factors Which Could Lead to Functional Failures 
Descriptive Generic In-depth examples 
Contaminants: Wet/Flood/Snow Wet/Flood/Snow 
Contaminants: Ice/Frost Ice/Frost 
Contaminants: Oil/Diesel Oil/Diesel 
Contaminants: Sand/Gravel/Mud Sand/Gravel/Mud 
Surface defects Potholes/Cracks/Bumps 
A. Road 
Condition 
Surface type 
Asphalt/Concrete/Untreated/Cobbles 
/Brick/Other 
Bend(s) Left/Right/Wide/Tight/Multiple bends 
Slope(s) Decline/Incline/Multiple slopes 
Road width 
Wide/Narrow/Single lane/Multiple 
lanes/Change in width 
Adverse camber Left/Right 
Traffic calming Road hump/Speed table/Throttle/Chicane 
Temporary road layout Roadworks/Other 
Misleading/complex road layout Misleading/Complex 
B. Road 
Geometry 
Speed-inciting layout 
Bend in road/Straight 
road/Gradient/Wide road/Continuity 
effect 
Flow Smooth/Erratic 
Speed High/Low/Stationary 
Density Low/High 
Other road user(s) : Absence of clues to 
manoeuvre 
Absence of clues to manoeuvre 
Other road user(s) : Ambiguity of clues to 
manoeuvre 
Ambiguity of clues to manoeuvre 
Other road user(s) : Atypical manoeuvres Atypical manoeuvres 
C. Traffic 
Condition 
Being drawn into manoeuvre 
Passenger/Vehicle ahead/Vehicle 
behind/Pedestrian/Cyclist 
Road lighting Type/Colour/Intensity/No lighting 
Vehicle lighting Type/Colour/Beam type/No lighting 
Day/night Daylight/Darkness/Dusk/Dawn 
Sun glare Direct from sun/Reflection from wet road 
Weather Rain/Fog or mist/Snow/Hail 
Smoke Vehicle/Nearby fire/Other 
Terrain profile Bend/Slope/Side slope(s)/Other 
Other vehicle(s) 
High vehicle/Wide vehicle/Parked 
vehicle/Vehicle stopped in traffic/Other 
D. Visibility 
Impaired 
Roadside objects 
Overhanging tree(s)/ Overhanging 
shrubbery/Sign(s)/Bridge 
structures/Barrier(s)/Wall(s)/Boundary 
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fence(s)/Other 
Traffic signs/signals - Insufficient 
Signs present but insufficient/Signals 
present but insufficient/Signs 
absent/Signals absent/Other 
Traffic signs/signals – Maintenance 
Signs damaged/Signals damaged/Signs 
poorly maintained/Signals poorly 
maintained/Signs positioned 
incorrectly/Signals positioned 
incorrectly/Other 
Traffic signs/signals – Unexpected 
Signs replaced/Signals replaced/Signs 
new/Signals new/Other 
Traffic signs/signals – Inappropriate 
Signs inappropriate/Signals 
inappropriate/Signs confusing/Signals 
confusing /Other 
Road markings (visual/tactile) - Insufficient 
Visual markings present but 
insufficient/Tactile markings present but 
insufficient/Visual markings 
absent/Tactile markings absent 
Road markings (visual/tactile) - Maintenance 
Visual markings damaged/ Tactile 
markings damaged/ Visual markings 
poorly maintained/ Tactile markings 
poorly maintained/ Visual markings 
positioned incorrectly/ Tactile markings 
positioned incorrectly/Other 
Road markings (visual/tactile) – Unexpected 
Visual markings replaced/ Tactile 
markings replaced/ Visual markings new/ 
Tactile markings new/Other 
E. Traffic 
Guidance 
Road markings (visual/tactile) - 
Inappropriate 
Visual markings inappropriate/ 
 Tactile markings inappropriate/  
Visual markings confusing/  
Tactile markings confusing /Other 
Earlier collision Vehicle(s)/Debris/Other 
Pedestrian in road Adult/Child/Other 
Fire in road/roadside 
Car in Road/Car in Roadside/Other in 
Road/Other in roadside 
Level crossing Controlled/Uncontrolled 
Animal in road 
Dog/Cat/Horse/Cow(s)/Pig(s)/Sheep/ 
Deer/Rabbit/Badger(s)/Fox(es)/Bird(s)/ 
Reptile(s)/Other animal(s) 
Other obstacle(s) in road 
Vehicle part/Dead animal/Discarded 
vehicle load/Other 
Road works Major/Minor/Other 
F. Other 
Environmental 
Factors 
High wind 
Gale force/Storm Force/Hurricane 
force/Other 
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Table 13 – Grid of Vehicle (tool) Related Factors Which Could Lead to Functional Failures 
Descriptive Generic In-depth examples 
Steering Partial failure/Total failure 
Brakes Partial failure/Total failure 
Engine Partial failure/Total failure 
Suspension Partial failure/Total failure 
A. Electro-
mechanical 
Electrical/electronics Partial failure/Total failure 
Windscreen/Glass 
Front chipped/ Front cracked/ 
Front misted/Front dirty / 
Front scratched/Rear chipped/ 
Rear cracked/Rear misted/ 
Rear dirty/Rear scratched/  
Side chipped/ Side cracked/ 
Side misted/Side dirty/ 
Side scratched/Other 
Tyre(s) 
Incorrect type/Air pressure/ Tread/ 
Blow-out/Other 
Exterior lights 
Headlight type/Headlight bulb needs 
replacing/Headlight cracked/Headlight 
broken cover/ Rear light type/ Rear light 
bulb needs replacing/ Rear light cracked/ 
Rear light broken cover/ Brake light 
type/ Brake light bulb needs replacing/ 
Brake light cracked/ Brake light broken 
cover/ Indicator type/ Indicator bulb 
needs replacing/ Indicator cracked/ 
Indicator broken cover/ Fog light type/ 
Fog light bulb needs replacing/ Fog light 
cracked/ Fog light broken cover/Other 
B. Maintenance 
Interior lights 
Fuel light/Oil light/Water light/Parking 
brake light/Other dashboard light/Other 
interior lighting 
Visibility 
A-pillar(s)/B-pillar(s)/C-
pillar(s)/Steering wheel blocking 
view/Rear view mirror/Wing 
mirror(s)/Seating/Other 
Auditory Auditory warnings confusing 
Displays 
Colour/Size/Confusing 
information/Other 
C. Design 
Controls 
Colour/Size/Confusing 
information/Reach/Other 
Heavy On vehicle/Within vehicle/Other 
Uneven On vehicle/Within vehicle/Other D. Load 
Visibility obstructed On vehicle/Within vehicle/Other 
 
